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promoted to the position of correctional counselor. Mackey testified in her deposition that she believed she failed to receive a
promotion to that position because she was not sexually involved with Kuykendall.
In addition, Brown repeatedly interrogated Mackey about her statements to the internal affairs investigator and attempted to contact
Mackey outside of work. Stress led to health problems, and Mackey was unable to work between August 1998 and January 1999.
Upon her return to work, Mackey was demoted and suffered further mistreatment and humiliation. A few months later she resigned,
finding the conditions of employment intolerable. Mackey filed a government tort claim with the Department in February 1999 and
filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing in March 1999. Mackey joined Miller in filing suit on June 15,
1999, alleging, among other claims, sexual discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FEHA.

c
As noted, defendants moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication of issues. The trial court determined the evidence of
the warden's sexual favoritism did not constitute discrimination or harassment under the FEHA and rejected plaintiffs' retaliation
claim. Miller's cause of action for disability discrimination survived, but summary adjudication [**86] in favor of defendants was
awarded on the remaining claims. Miller subsequently dismissed her complaint with its single remaining cause of action for disability
discrimination; the court entered judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that a supervisor who grants favorable employment opportunities to a person with whom
the supervisor is having a sexual affair does not, without more, commit sexual harassment toward other, nonfavored employees.
According to the Court of Appeal, plaintiffs were in the same position as male employees who failed to acquire the benefits that
Kuykendall accorded to Bibb, Patrick, and Brown. With respect to the claim that Kuykendall's behavior created an actionable hostile
work environment, the appellate court observed: "Ignoring for the moment evidence of retaliation for threatened, or actual, reporting
of the relationships, plaintiffs have demonstrated unfair conduct in the workplace by virtue of Kuykendall's preferential treatment of
his various sexual partners. However, beyond the fact of those relationships and the preferential treatment, plaintiffs have not shown
a concerted pattern of harassment suffiCiently pervasive to have altered the conditions of their employment on the basis of sex.
Plaintiffs [*460] were not themselves subjected to sexual advances, and were not treated any differently than male employees at
[the prison]. Hence the trial [***809] court correctly concluded there is no evidentiary basis for plaintiffs' various sex
discrimination and harassment claims."
With respect to plaintiffs' claim that defendants retaliated against them because they protested practices forbidden by the FEHA, the
Court of Appeal concluded that defendants properly had prevailed on plaintiffs' retaliation claim, evidently because the appellate court
found the record demonstrated that plaintiffs did not exhibit a subjective belief, when they made their complaints, that they were
reporting conduct prohibited by the FEHA or that they were complaining of sexual discrimination or sexual harassment.

II

A
CAOJ'i'(1) We emphasize at the outset that the present case comes to us on appeal from a grant of summary judgment and summary
adjudication. HNl7-A trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment only if no issues of triable fact appear and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Co® Ciy. prQc. §437c, suQ(:j. (c); see also id., § 43Jc, sub.~t (f) [summary
adjudication of issues].) The moving party bears the burden of showing the court that the plaintiff "has not established, and cannot
reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie case ,,' ." ($i'JeJzle.r v.lldvanee.d Group 4QQ (2.QQ;I..) 25 CCjIAth 763, 768. [107 Cal. Rptr.
2d617, 23 P.3d U43].) HN27-CA(2)7-(2) On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we examine the record de
novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party. (Wiener y..$outhcoC/st Chi/dearg (gnters, Inc. (2004) 32 C31Ath 1138, 1142 [12 Cal. Rptr. 3d p1S, 88
P. 3d 517].)
L

B
The FEHA expressly prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace. 5 It is an unlawful [**87] employment practice HN37-"[f]or an
employer" because of ... [*461] sex ... to harass an employee .. , ." (Gov, Code, § 12240, subd.U)(1).) The FEHA also provides
that "[sexual] [h]arassment of an employee ... by an employee, other than an agent or supervisor, shall be unlawful if the entity, or
its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action," (Ibid.) For the purposes of the relevant provisions of the FEHA, HN47-" 'harassment' because of sex includes sexual
harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." (Id., § 12940, subd.
(j)(4)(C).)
FOOTNOTES
Plaintiffs asserted claims for sexual discrimination and sexual harassment under the FEHA. In their complaint, plaintiffs styled
these claims as constituting a Single cause of action, and the Court of Appeal treated them as such. As we noted in Reno v. Baird
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, Mg,.oS7 (7o.Ci,lJ, Rptf. 29499, 9SJ P.2d 1333J, however, claims for sexual discrimination and sexual
harassment are distinct causes of action, each arising from different provisions of the FEHA.

5

Plaintiffs based their sexual discrimination and harassment claim on the same circumstances, and the thrust of their argument in
the trial court, the Court of Appeal, and this court has been that they were subjected to sexual harassment, Observing that sexual
harassment is a form of sexual discrimination (see Acegrdj v, SUPerior CQurt(1993) 17. Ci,lI.App.4th 341, 34S [21 Cal. Rptr, 2d
292], and cases cited; see also Aguilarl/. Avis Rent ACarsys(ern, Inc. (999) 21 CaJ.4th 121, 129 [87 CaI. Rptr. 2d 132, 980
P.2d 846] [harassment on the baSis of race is a form of employment discrimination]), the Court of Appeal analyzed plaintiffs'
claim principally under the law applicable to sexual harassment, and we shall do the same.

[***810] CA(3J'i'(3} HN57-According to the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC), the agency charged with
administering the FEHA, harassment on any basis prohibited by the FEHA includes (but is not limited to) verbal harassment, including
"epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis enumerated in the Act"; physical harassment, including "assault, impeding or

00801.'
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blocking movement, or any physical interference with normal work or movement, when directed at an individual on a basis
enumerated in the Act"; and visual harassment, including "derogatory posters, cartoons, or drawings on a basis enumerated in the
Act." (Qll,~Qcl~J~,e~"tlL2,§ }1~lZ.§,~~J:ill,--{R1L!J(M, rn) & (~).) The regulations also specify that "unwanted sexual advances
which condition an employment benefit upon an exchange of sexual favors" constitute harassment. (Id., § Z~eLQ, s!,!Q<L(b}Ul(D)·)
In the speCific context of sexual discrimination, prohibited harassment may include "verbal, physical, and visual harassment, as well
as unwanted sexual advances." (Id., §.'Z22.Ll~ subd,jfl(ll·)

CA(4J+(4) HN6+Past California decisions have established that the prohibition against sexual harassment includes protection from a
broad range of conduct, ranging from expressly or impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to or tolerance of
unwelcome sexual advances, to the creation of a work environment that is hostile or abusive on the basis of sex. (fifi/]{;L'!. $~q[/et;;;dr:Q
e~ninsu@fio~pHi1{(1'JJl'1l2HJ;ilU~QQL_3d 59.0,@}-6J)8H62J;aL RpJr.e'f2]; see also Mogjlg{s1~yj{.Sup~riQ[ CQurt (J'J2::!L2Q
Cj!1.APpAth14Q'J,Hl<t::141~1l6C~RIlli:._Ml16].) 6 Such a hostile environment [*462] may be created even if the plaintiff
never is subjected to sexual advances. (MQgilg~lsy j{.~Sj,JPJ:[iQLCQt.![t,supri1, 2~LCill.AQP.4thi'ltPP. J411-1115.) In one case, for
example, a cause of action based upon a hostile environment was stated when the plaintiff alleged she had been subjected to longstanding ridicule, insult, threats, and especially exacting work requirements by male coworkers who evidently resented a female
employee's entry into a position in law enforcement. (AcS;qrgL'f.. SI/j2griQ[ (Qwt. ~sI/P[~ 17 Clll,APpAJ;h lltQQ, 34 7:: 3~8.)
FOOTNOTES
6 Some cases draw a sharp distinction between the two types of harassment, namely so-called quid pro quo and hostile work
environment harassment. (See EiJiiJer V~SSlflP~dro [>gf).insuli1_t1osp~,st.!{2rq, 214(:a1, APQ. ~3d atR. 6Q7.) Later cases have
acknowledged that the two theories of liability are intertwined. (See fJurliagtonll]gl,LsJ;ries, Il]c,'!.EllgttlJ U99_el~211,.!.~.2_42,
?SUHLbJ;Q.~d 63:4U 8 S. ct. 225?J; Mogile~IsY'L._~~O[ COl/tt, su{2@,2Q Ci'lLARP.4tlJilt p.1H5; §jf1YD_'!~~AI&'I
/nIQnngUon S)tst~sJru;.~(1'J93) D CaI.AQQ.'ltb~~lQQ5J16~aJ~Rpt[.2~ ZS?] [characterizing the two types of harassment as
not distinct forms of harassment but "poles of a continuum"], disapproved on another point in Lai<jQ,!,\Ni1tkiflfi4!isociiJreg
lruij,J;;tr~~316~ilL4tbM1, 664 [25 CaLBptr----2l;L1Q2,j~U1'2QW!l.)

CA(5J+(S) We have agreed with the United States Supreme Court that, HN7':;to prevail, an employee claiming harassment based upon
a hostile work environment must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex. (See
Aguil<lJJ,'·A'!is BenCAC<lJ SY5tem~Il2c'J_St.!{2[~~2LQll,4ttL91Q,l3Q, relying upon I:t<lrr!$ 'I, fOEk!dlSysteffi?,Jnc. ~(12~U1.5HLI,.!.,~~~1},
2.t U2§J..,,~X;~,2'L295. lH-'s~t.~ZJ.) The working environment must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances:
"[W]hether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. [***811] [**88]
These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating. or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." (tfSlrris '!.fQ!kllILSYSreillS,
Im:;"slJJ2[ql- 51QJ..!,S,at ~23.)
CA(6J+(6) HNB+The United States Supreme Court has warned that the evidence in a hostile environment sexual harassment case
should not be viewed too narrowly: "[T]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances.' [Citation.] '" . [TJhat inquiry requires careful consideration of the
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target .... The real social impact of workplace behavior
often depends on a constellation of surrounding Circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a
simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensibility to social context,
will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing ... and conduct which a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive." (OQciJle 'I. St.!ndowne, Offshore Seryice$, Inc. (1296) 52::! !.!~.S.~ ?5,8J.-li2
[HQ 1, Ecl._4.d2Ql,11JI S,j;;t, 991U; see also EJeyq;;L,!,C/tY-onOfiAageles 099S) 95 Cal..A.pp,4th 5ll, 5l?::518 L?6J::llJ. Rp\'T,2d
54?].)
[*463] Our courts frequently turn to federal authorities interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 !.!.S.~C. § 2QQQe~ ~t
seq.) (Title VII) for assistance in interpreting the FEHA and its prohibition against sexual harassment. (See Aguilar v, .Av!sBsmJ 4ei1,
System, Ll]c., SUP[<I, ~2~1 Cal4tblltPP,_.:L22::13Q; lleygiJY. _Qt'/-Qf Los Angeles, 5l/pra, 95 Clll.APP.4th at p. 517.) Although the FEHA
explicitly prohibits sexual harassment of employees, while Title VII does not, the two enactments share the common goal of
preventing discrimination in the workplace. Federal courts agree with guidelines established by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with administering Title VII, in viewing sexual harassment as constituting sexual
discrimination in violation of Title VII. (See ~e[ito£SiJ,!.EJgBIs,f'SllV. liinsol] U 986)4 77 l!.S. 57. 64:-~65 [91 \.,. Ed. 2Q 4'J,~~.lQ9. S,~t.
2399].) In language comparable to that found in the FEHA and in FEHC regulations, federal regulatory guidelines define sexual
harassment as including unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature that has the "purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offenSive working environment." (22.C.f.R §lpQ4.J.l(a)(3) (20Q4).)
A lengthy policy statement issued by the EEOC has examined the question of sexual favoritism, relying in part upon a number of
federal court decisions that have considered the kind of harassment claim brought by plaintiffs, namely one based principally on the
favoritism shown by supervisors to employees who are the supervisors' sexual partners. (Off. of Legal Counsel, Policy Guidance on
Employer liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism (Jan. 12, 1990) No. N-915-048 in 2 EEOC Compliance Manual foil. § 615
(EEOC Policy Statement No. N-915-048.) In its 1990 policy statement, the EEOC observed that, although isolated instances of sexual
favoritism in the workplace do not violate Title VII, widespread sexual favoritism may create a hostile work environment in violation of
Title VII by sending [***812] the demeaning message that managers view female employees as" 'sexual playthings'" or that "the
way for women to get ahead in the workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct." 7 We believe the policy statement provides a useful
guide in evaluating the issue before us.
FOOTNOTES
7 The policy statement was issued in 1990 by the EEOC and specifies that it was approved by Clarence Thomas-then the
Chairperson of the EEOC and now an ASSOCiate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
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The EEOC policy statement is entitled Policy Guidance on Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism. It covers three
topics: isolated favoritism, favoritism [**,89] when sexual favors have been coerced, and widespread favoring of consensual sexual
partners. The policy statement begins with an explanation that "[a]n isolated instance of favoritism toward a 'paramour' (or [*464]
a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or men in violation of Title VII, since both are
disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders. [Fn. omitted.] A female charging party who is denied an employment benefit
because of such sexual favoritism would not have been treated more favorably had she been a man, nor, conversely, was she treated
less favorably because she was a woman." (EEOC Policy Statement No. N-91S-048, supra, § A, italics added.) •
FOOTNOTES

This portion of the EEOC policy statement reflects the position of a great majority of federal courts. (See f2eQnl'lQJ{, Wegcl1c;sJer
C;oj.JmYf':1~c:ILc;a! Center (2(L Cif. J9fH?1,aQZf .2dJ_Q'l.308; see also $chQ/;Jf;trtUlIiOOis.Dept.Q[IR!flS.Q,ilJh Clr ._20021 304.E. 3d
ZZS, Z33; Worn"ck \I. RUIlYQn.(llth Clr._J9981J.4ZL3d.l~.J300; I"kenJt.QlsigholJ1il.c:..o[Q, C~~C!Jlth..Qr~.199Z1 USL3d

8

1366,13§9-131Q.)

The policy statement next explains the commission's position with respect to coerced sexual activity, including the Situation in which
the coercion results in employment benefits for a victim who is not complaining. Because coercion is not alleged in the present case,
this element of the policy statement is not relevant to the question before us.
Finally, the EEOC discusses sexual favoritism that is more than isolated and that is based upon consensual affairs: "If favoritism
based upon the granting of sexual favors is widespread in a workplace, both male and female colleagues who do not welcome this
conduct can establish a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is directed
at them and regardless of whether those who were granted favorable treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors. In these
circumstances, a message is implicitly conveyed that the managers view women as 'sexual playthings,' thereby creating an
atmosphere that is demeaning to women. Both men and women who find this offensive can establish a violation if the conduct is
'sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [their] employment and create an abusive working environment."
, [Citations.] [Fn. omitted.] An analogy can be made to a situation in which supervisors in an office regularly make racial, ethnic or
sexual jokes. Even if the targets of the humor 'play along' and in no way display that they object, co-workers of any race, national
origin or sex can claim that this conduct, which communicates a bias against protected class members, creates a hostile work
environment for them. [Citations.]" (EEOC Policy Statement No. N-91S-048, supra, § C.)
In addition, according to the EEOC, "[m]anagers who engage in widespread sexual favoritism may also communicate a message that
the way for women to get ahead in the workplace is by engaging in [***813] sexual conduct or that sexual soliCitations are a
prerequisite to their fair treatment. [Fn. omitted.] This can form the basis of an implicit 'quid pro quo' harassment claim for [*465]
female employees, as well as a hostile environment claim for both women and men who find this offensive." (EEOC Policy Statement
No. N-915-048, supra, § C.)
To illustrate its point, the EEOC discussed Brqc:l.er!c;Js_"" .Ruc:lc;rlQJU::~19fHll§.a5.f..Sypp,.1269, in which the court concluded sexual
favoritism contributed to a hostile work environment that violated Title VII. The plaintiff, in that case an attorney, alleged that two of
her supervisors had given employment benefits to two secretaries with whom they were conducting sexual affairs and that another
supervisor favored an attorney because of his sexual attraction to her. As the EEOC also noted, there were "isolated" unwanted sexual
advances made to the plaintiff. The EEOC stressed the court's discussion of sexual favoritism in the workplace, which "undermined
plaintiff's motivation and work performance and deprived plaintiff, and other ." female employees, of promotions and job
opportunities." (E3rOc:lf;rick II, Ruitef,$upJ:<1,..68S E.sI,!QQ.a.t'kJ27~; EEOC Policy Statement No. N-915-048, supra, § C.) The EEOC
policy statement commented that, although the Broderick deciSion turned upon a hostile work environment analysis, the facts also
could have supported an implied quid [**90] pro quo claim "since the managers, by their conduct, communicated a message to all
female employees in the office that job benefits would be awarded to those who participated in sexual conduct. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
The one pertinent California deCision generally indicates that the standards and reasoning embodied in the EEOC policy statement
provide appropriate guidelines in interpreting and applying the relevant provisions of the FEHA. In PLo.k'ielv.. G<'1tt!s(199P)41,
Ci'lI,App,'fth ~62g [49 Cal. Bptr• ..2d _:3;12]' although the court rejected a claim based upon favoritism arising from a single affair in a
small office, it recognized sexual favoritism could create a hostile environment. In dictum, the court in Proksel suggested that sexual
favoritism by a manager may be actionable when it leads employees to believe that "they [can] obtain favorable treatment from [the
manager] if they became romantically involved with him" (iIL_Qt_R.1.62.9), the affair is conducted in a manner "so indiscreet as to
create a hostile work environment," or the manager has engaged in "other pervasive conduct ". which created a hostile work
environment." (Jet. i:!tPp. 1629-J,PJQ.) The Court of Appeal in Proksel Cited the Broderick decision (limQs;.ciC;:/s y"RUa(;!L, SI.!/2[<I.,682 £,
Supp. 12(9) and another federal court decision suggesting that overt manifestations of sexual favoritism may create a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII when they convey the message that a woman cannot be "evaluated on grounds other than her
sexuality." (Orin!swat£;r v. I.1nionC'1f'/;JIQ~U;grP~Drc:LCir..J99QL901f.2.da2:t862; see ia,aJ;,Q, 86J.Jo._12,) Indeed, the concept of
conduct that gives rise to a hostile work environment by creating a work atmosph£;re that is demeaning to women is not new. (See
Cat Code Rc;gs., tit.2,§ 72!3].Q,$\.Ij:>d.i!:>JU1(c) [stating that harassment may [*466] include the posting of derogatory images];
ACcQrc:li II· $up(;!fior Cgurt, 'il1priJ, J.7Ca).AppAJ:hJj..tQP,,3.'lZ_-:31.8i ~{;Qs;._'t, ECl.[TrLlUfJ.[QS, CQ. (9tnJ::;ir,129-1J;Uf.Jd a91 ..89] & fn. J
[recognizing demeaning gender-based conduct as sexual harassment]i /.JR.Sc;tt 't~ lJl]ille[5iJy.QfPusl!IQRic;:oLlstCi[.J9~.81.82'4F.2Q
8131, 90S [recognizing the posting of lurid images as sexual harassment).}

[***814] CA(7)"+(7) Following the guidance of the EEOC, and also employing standards adopted in our prior cases, we believe that
HN9;;an employee may establish an actionable claim of sexual harassment under the FEHA by demonstrating that widespread sexual
favoritism was severe or pervasive enough to alter his or her working conditions and create a hostile work environment. (See A9yilq r
v. Avis R£;nt A Cqr System, Inc., suprq,21 Ci'lIAthi'ltQ....tJQ.) Furthermore, applying this standard to the circumstances of the present
case, we conclude that the evidence proffered by plaintiffs, viewed in its entirety, established a prima faCie case of sexual harassment
under a hostile-work-environment theory. As we shall explain, a trier of fact reasonably could find from the evidence in the record set
forth below that a hostile work environment was created in the workplace in question.

c
Over a period of several years, Warden Kuykendall engaged concurrently in sexual affairs with three subordinate employees, Bibb,
Patrick, and Brown. There was evidence these affairs began in 1991 and continued until 1998. The affairs occurred first while
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Kuykendall and the women worked at CCWF, then continued when these individuals all transferred to VSPW. Kuykendall served in a
management capacity at both institutions and served as warden at VSPW. When Kuykendall transferred from CCWF to VSPW, there
was evidence he caused his sexual partners to be transferred to the new institution to join him. There was evidence Kuykendall
promised and granted unwarranted and unfair employment benefits to the three women. One of the unfair employment benefits
granted to Brown evidently was the power to abuse other employees who complained concerning the affairs. When plaintiffs
complained, they suffered retaliation (and they believed two other employees were similarly targeted). Kuykendall refused to
intervene and himself retaliated by withdrawing [**91] previously granted accommodations for Miller's disability after she
cooperated with the internal affairs investigation.
Further, there was evidence that advancement for women at VSPW was based upon sexual favors, not merit. For example,
Kuykendall pressured Miller and other employees on the personnel selection committee to agree to transfer Bibb to VSPW and
promote her to the position of correctional counselor, despite the conclUSion of the committee that she was not eligible [*467] or
qualified. Committee members were told to set aside their professional judgment because Kuykendall wanted them to "make it
happen."
In addition, on two occaSions Kuykendall promoted Brown to facility captain positions in preference to Miller, although Miller was more
qualified. Brown enjoyed an unprecedented pace of promotion to the managerial position of aSSOCiate warden, causing outraged
ernployees to ask such questions as, "What do I have to do, 'F' my way to the top?" Even Brown acknowledged that affairs between
supervisors and subordinates were common in the Department and were widely viewed as a method of advancement. Indeed, Brown
made it known to Miller that the facility captain promotion belonged to her because of her intimate relationship with Kuykendall,
announcing that if she were not awarded the promotion she would "take him [Kuykendall] down" because she "knew every scar on
his body."
There also was evidence that Kuykendall promoted Bibb from clerical to correctional staff duties despite her lack of qualifications, and
at the same time refused to [***815] permit Mackey to secure the on-the-job training that would have enabled her to make a
similar advance. On the basis of her knowledge of Kuykendall's sexual affairs, Mackey believed the reason he denied her this
opportunity was that she was not his sexual partner.
The evidence suggested Kuykendall viewed female employees as "sexual playthings" and that his ensuing conduct conveyed this
demeaning message in a manner that had an effect on the work force as a whole. Various employees, including plaintiffs, observed
Kuykendall and Bibb fondling one another on at least three occasions at work-related social gatherings. One employee reported that
Kuykendall had placed his arm around her and another female employee during one such social event, adding that Kuykendall had
engaged in unwelcome fondling of her as well. Bibb and Brown bragged to other employees, including plaintiffs, of their power to
extort benefits from Kuykendall. Jealous scenes between the sexual partners occurred in the presence of Miller and other employees.
Several employees informed the internal affairs investigator that persons who were engaged in sexual affairs with Kuykendall
received special benefits. When Miller last complained to Kuykendall, he told her that Brown was manipulative, adding he was
"finished" with Brown and should have chosen Miller-a comment Miller reasonably took to mean that he should have chosen Miller for
a sexual affair.
There was evidence Kuykendall's sexual favoritism not only blocked the way to merit-based advancement for plaintiffs, but also
caused them to be subjected to harassment at the hands of Brown, whose behavior Kuykendall refused or failed to control even after
it escalated to physical assault. This [*468] harassment, apparently retaliatory, included loss of work responsibilities, demeaning
comments in the presence of other employees, loss of entitlement to a pay enhancement and to disability accommodation, and
physical assault and false imprisonment. Kuykendall explained to Miller that, because of his intimate relationship with Brown, he
would not protect plaintiffs. In this manner, his sexual favoritism was responsible for the continuation of an outrageous campaign of
harassment against plaintiffs.

CA(Sr;(8) ConSidering all the circumstances "from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position" (Oncale v.
SllndownerOffs/JoreServicf!s, In£:., suprCJ, 523 U.S. <It p. St), and noting that the present case is before us on appeal after a grant of
summary judgment, we conclude that the foregoing evidence created at least a triable issue of fact on the question whether'
Kuykendall's conduct constituted sexual favoritism widespread enough to constitute a hostile work environment in which the
"message [**92] [was] impliCitly conveyed that the managers view women as 'sexual playthings' " or that "the way for women to
get ahead in the workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct" thereby "creating an atmosphere that is demeaning to women." (EEOC
Policy Statement No. N-915-04S, supra, § C.) In terms we previously have borrowed from the United States Supreme Court in
measuring sexual harassment claims, there was evidence of" 'sufficiently severe or pervasive' " conduct that" , "alter[edi the
conditions of [the victims'] employment" , " such that a jury reasonably could conclude that the conduct created a work environment
that qualifies as hostile or abUSive to employees because of their gender. (Aguil,,[ v. AyisRf!l?tA f::arSystem, Inc., svpra, 21 Cal.4th
at p.130.)

o
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeal essentially conceded [***816] that widespread sexual favoritism covld
support a claim for sexual harassment if the accompanying conduct were sufficiently pervasive or severe, but concluded plaintiffs had
failed to make an adequate showing in this respect, especially in the absence of any evidence that they had been sexually
propositioned or that the sexual affairs were nonconsensual. But California law (like the EEOC policy statement quoted above)
provides that plaintiffs may establish the existence of a hostile work environment even when they themselves have not been sexually
propositioned. ($eYdCJ v. City of ~osAngelf!s,supra, <:;5 C<lI.APP.'lth <It p. 519; fishf!f \I. San Pf:dro Peninsula Hospital, supra, 214 Cal.
App. 3d at pp. oto-ol1; EEOC Policy Statement No. N-915-04S, supra, § C, example 3.) Further, as the EEOC policy statement
points out, even widespread favoritism based upon consensual sexual affairs may imbue the workplace with an atmosphere that is
demeaning to women because a message is conveyed that managers view women as [*469] "sexual playthings" or that the way
required to secure advancement is to engage in sexual conduct with managers. In focusing upon the question whether the sexual
favoritism was coerCive, the Court of Appeal overlooked the principle that even in the absence of coercive behavior, certain conduct
creates a work atmosphere so demeaning to women that it constitutes an actionable hostile work environment.
The Court of Appeal commented that the Broderick and Drinkwater deCisions discussed not only evidence of widespread sexual
favoritism but also the assertedly coercive effect of a supervisor's sexual advances to the plaintiff and of a generally sexually charged
atmosphere. In Broderick, the court referred to pervasive "conduct of a sexual nature" and noted isolated instances in which sexual
advances were made upon the plaintiff, but it also observed that the more important conSideration was the effect of sexual favoritism
on the work environment. (Broderick v. Rl!der, supra, 6~.5 F. Supp. at p. 127S.) Similarly, in Drinkwater the court, although referring
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to an atmosphere of "sexual innuendo" or a "sexually charged" work atmosphere created by a sexual affair, also explained that "[t]he
theoretical basis for the kind of environmental claim alleged here is that the sexual relationship impresses the workplace with such a
cast that the plaintiff is made to feel that she is judged only by her sexuality." (Qrin1qY{JJer \/... Ilniol] (a.rI:Jjde.1:iJ[Q., ~l.Ip[CIL.9Q4. F.~cl at
p, 1361 & fn. 15.) Again, the important and underlying inquiry in these cases was whether the conduct in question conveyed a
message that demeans employees on the basis of their sex.
Putting aside the question whether the Broderick and Drinkwater cases properly can be distinguished from the circumstances of the
present case, we believe it is clear under California law that a plaintiff may establish a hostile work environment without
demonstrating the existence of coercive sexual conduct directed at the plaintiff or even conduct of a sexual nature. (See §f3!YQg v.l::ity
QU.osAnge/es,sI)P£i'l, §SCal.AppAth at p ..519 [" 'The plaintiff's work environment is affected not only by conduct directed at herself
but also by the treatment of others' "]; A.cCCl[J:i! v. Superior (Qurt, suprC'i, J] CilkApp.4tb i'lt p, ~45 [sexual harassment under a
hostile-work-environment theory "does not necessarily involve sexual conduct. [**93] It need not have anything to do with lewd
acts, double entendres or sexual advances"]; see also OnC9/e II. Sun downer Offshore S..ervil;;f3!s, Inc., sMPRI. 5'l,~ W..S. i'lt p ...80
["harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire"]; [***8171 MQgilefs/5yy.sl)peJioL(Qt.l(t, SI),QrCl,'l,OCi'lI,AppAJhatP,
14:l,4; 2 Chin et aL, Cal Practice Guide: Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 2004) 111110:240-10:246, pp. 10-40 to 10-41.)
Finally, we believe that even those courts focusing on a "sexually charged environment" would be satisfied that a triable issue of fact
was presented by the evidence in this case, in view of the bragging, squabbling, and fondling that occurred.

[*4701 We stress that, because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, a reviewing court must
examine the evidence de novo and should draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. (Wiener. v.;;Ql)tt)(:;;Qi'lst
Chlld@£e<::enters In_c., ~uQrC'i, 3~ Cal.4.th .Clt p. U42.) We believe the Court of Appeal failed to draw such inferences and took too
narrow a view of the surrounding Circumstances. (See Qncg/e v. $I)ndowner Offshore.$ervL<;fN'i, 1m;" s!.lQrg,.S23l,LS... at pp, 8.l~82;
see also §eyc;j{Jv~Qtyol t..Qsl3nge/~s,suprC'i, ()5. Cal.App.4th at pp. 517-518; Ai.:CC'irdi v. SI.IQf3!(!Q[.(QuIT, S!JJ)£i'l, rz.Ci'l!.ApQ.4thatPQ,

3SQ::.351. )
Defendants attempt to counter plaintiffs' claims by referring to a number of the cases holding that isolated preferential treatment of a
sexual partner, standing a/one, does not constitute sexual discrimination. (See fn. 8, ante, at p. 464.) The Court of Appeal also cited
these cases. In such instances, the discrimination is said to turn merely on personal preference, and male and female nonfavored
employees are equally disadvantaged. Although we do not dispute the principle stated by these cases, we believe the Court of Appeal
and defendants err in equating the present case with those cases. Whether or not Kuykendall was motivated by personal preference
or by discriminatory intent, a hostile work environment was shown to have been created by widespread favoritism. As discussed,
plaintiffs in the present case alleged far more than that a supervisor engaged in an isolated workplace sexual affair and accorded
special benefits to a sexual partner. They proffered evidence demonstrating the effect of widespread favoritism on the work
environment, namely the creation of an atmosphere that was demeaning to women. Further, as the EEOC policy statement observes,
an atmosphere that is sufficiently demeaning to women may be actionable by both men and women.
Defendants urge that, in the asserted absence of evidence that Kuykendall flaunted his consensual sexual affairs, coerced or sought
to derive advantage from other employees in connection with them, or engaged in "open sexual conduct, sexual discussions, or other
indiscreet behavior in the workplace," the facts of the present case show nothing more than the kind of standard sexual favoritism
claim that has been rejected as a basiS for liability under the FEHA and Title VII. We disagree. Again, defendants have overlooked the
Circumstance that widespread sexual favoritism may be actionable because of the effect it has on the work environment.
Further, we question the factual premise of defendant's argument. There was evidence of considerable flaunting of the relationships
affecting the workplace, consisting of Bibb's and Brown's bragging and the jealous scenes between these two women, along with
Kuykendall's indiscreet behavior at a number of work-related social gatherings. The favoritism that ensued from the sexual affairs
also was on public display, reflected in Kuykendall's [*471] [***818] permitting Brown to abuse plaintiffs, his directive to the
interview committee to promote Bibb, and his repeated admissions that he would not or could not control Brown because of his sexual
relationship with her. It may even be inferred that Kuykendall solicited sexual favors in return for employment benefits, in light of
Bibb's and Brown's boasts, the sequence of promotions awarded by Kuykendall, and his comment to Miller, "1 should have chose[n]
you."

[**94] To the extent defendants' contention is that a reasonable person in plaintiffs' pOSition would not have found the work
environment to have been hostile toward women on the basis of widespread sexual favoritism, we conclude that the lower courts
erred in precluding plaintiffs from presenting this issue to a jury. The internal affairs investigation within the Department confirmed
that Kuykendall's sexual favoritism occurred and was broadly known and resented in the workplace, and that several employeesincluding Brown-concluded that engaging in sexual affairs was the way required to secure advancement. There was evidence from
which a jury reasonably could conclude that the entire scheme of promotion at VSPW was affected by Kuykendall's favoritism.
Certainly, the presence of mere office gossip is insufficient to establish the existence of widespread sexual favoritism, but the
evidence of such favoritism in the present case includes admissions by the participants concerning the nature of the relationships,
boasting by the favored women, eyewitness accounts of inCidents of public fondling, repeated promotion despite lack of qualifications,
and Kuykendall's admission he could not control Brown because of his sexual relationship with her-a matter confirmed by the
Department's internal affairs report. Indeed, it is ironic that, according to defendants, a jury should not be permitted to consider
evidence of widespread sexual favoritism that the Department itself found convincing.
Finally, defendants warn that plaintiffs' position, if adopted, would inject the courts into relationships that are private and consensual
and that occur within a major locus of individual social life for both men and women-the workplace. According to defendants, social
policy favors rather than disfavors such relationships, and the issue of personal privacy should give courts pause before allowing
claims such as those advanced by plaintiffs to proceed. Defendants urge it is safer to treat sexual favoritism as merely a matter of
personal preference, and to recall that the FEHA is not intended to regulate sexual relationships in the workplace, nor to establish a
civility code governing that venue.

CA(9J+(9) We do not believe that defendants' concerns about regulating personal relationships are well founded, because it is not the
relationship, but its effect [*472] on the workplace, that is relevant under the applicable legal standard. Thus, we have not
discussed those interactions between Kuykendall and his sexual partners that were truly private. Moreover, the FEHA already clearly
contemplates some intrusion into personal relationships. Specifically HNI°'i'the FEHA recognizes that sexual harassment occurs when
a sexual relationship between a supervisor and a subordinate is based upon an asserted quid pro quo.

III
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As noted, plaintiffs also alleged a cause of action for retaliation in violation of the FEHA.
CA( lOli'(10)

HNl1+rhe FEHA protects employees against retaliation for filing a complaint or participating in proceedings or hearings
under the act, or for opposing conduct made un [***819] lawful by the act. (Gov. CQde,~ 122-tQ,~sJ'!Qd. (h).) Specifically, section
12940, sutJdiyisiQn io), declares that it is an unlawful employment practice for HN12+"any employer ... or person to discharge, expel,
or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the
person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part."

CA(l1)+(ll) This enactment aids enforcement of the FEHA and promotes communication and informal dispute resolution in the
workplace. (f/git Y.North;LrnerLc;g[LWgtcl,-C;orp~(J922l3S::atJ~RP,4th 46L4Z6-177 H CaL. Rptr.2d 522].) HNl~Employees may
establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by showing that (1) they engaged in activities protected by the FEHA, (2) their
employers subsequently took adverse employment action against them, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action. (JCgt,P-PR.4thatR.4Z6.)

Miller asserted she engaged in protected activity in complaining about "improper relationships and sexual favoritism" and that "(w]
hen Miller complained to Warden Tina [**95] Farmon about Kuykendall's affair with Bibb, when she complained to Gerald Harris
about the Warden's [Kuykendall's] affairs and resulting harassment, when she complained to Brown about the affairs and resulting
harassment, when she told Kuykendall of Brown's assault and battery on her, when she participated in Internal Affairs investigation,
and when she subsequently wrote to Richard Ehle that [the Department] had failed to protect her after she testified, she was
opposing the hostile work environment at [the Department] which resulted from the Warden's sexual favoritism." Miller added that
she engaged in protected activity in seeking accommodation for her physical disability, and complained that the resulting
accommodation was withdrawn after she cooperated in the internal affairs investigation.
[*473] Miller asserted that she suffered retaliation in a number of additional ways. She presented evidence that, in response to her
complaints, supervisorial employees Brown and Yamamoto undermined her authority in various respects, publicly demeaned her,
imposed additional onerous duties upon her, and subjected her to ostracism. Brown, a management employee, physically assaulted
Miller in an effort to silence her, and threatened Miller with retribution as a result of Miller's cooperation with the internal affairs
investigation. As previously noted, there was evidence that Kuykendall withdrew accommodations previously accorded Miller on
account of her physical disability, and that he refused to curb Brown's abuse.
Plaintiff Mackey claimed she "engaged in protected activity under the FEHA when she complained on numerous occaSions about what
she and other women perceived to be a hostile work environment based on the sexual affairs of the Warden and the unchecked
harassment suffered as a result of those affairs. In 1997, she discussed with her superior, Edna Miller, the harassment by Brown
which went unchecked because of the Warden's affair with Brown. Miller then raised the issue with a sex harassment advisor Gerald
Harris and with Warden Kuykendall. Mackey complained to chief deputy warden Vicky Yamamoto and to Warden Kuykendall about
Brown's assault on Miller which resulted from Miller's stating she would report the affairs and favoritism, and neither Yamamoto nor
Kuykendall took appropriate corrective action. In 1998, Mackey complained to Internal Affairs about the sexual affairs, favoritism and
the unchecked harassment which resulted."
[***820] Mackey claimed she suffered retaliation, providing evidence she was deprived of eligibility for a promotion, lost special
pay for inmate contact, suffered ostraCism, and was reassigned to tasks well below her capacity. She also alleged that Brown verbally
abused and threatened her as a result of Mackey's cooperation with the internal affairs investigation.
Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal reached the question whether defendants had taken an adverse employment action
against plaintiffs based on their complaints of sexual harassment, or the question whether there was a causal connection between the
asserted protected activity and any adverse action, because each court determined that plaintiffs had failed to make a prima facie
showing that they had engaged in protected activity by opposing sexual harassment that was prohibited by the FEHA.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, a retaliation claim may be brought by an employee who has
complained of or opposed conduct, even when a court or jury subsequently determines the conduct actually was not prohibited by the
FEHA. Indeed, this precept is well settled. (Flqit v. North.American Watch Corp., slJpra, 3 Cal.App.4th atp. 47.7 [*474] [the plaintiff
may prevail "even if the harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive that it altered [the plaintiffs] work environment"]; Mayo
v. Gomez (9th Cir. 1994) 40 f.3d 982, 265; Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa FeRy. Co. (9th Cir. 1982) 685 F.2d 1149, li57.) An
employee is protected against retaliation if the employee reasonably and in good faith believed that what he or she was opposing
constituted unlawful employer conduct such as sexual harassment or sexual discrimination. (Flgit v. North American Watch Corp.,
supra, 3 Cal.App.4th ilt p. 477; see also fA;.O~C. y. Crown [**2~] Ze/ierbiJch Corp. (9th,C:ir. 1963)
F.2g1008, 1013, fn. 2.)

no

The Court of Appeal concluded, however, that although plaintiffs had opposed Kuykendall's conduct, they had not engaged in
protected activity, because they had not expressed opposition to sex discrimination or sexual harassment. As the court understood
the record, "[p]laintiffs were not complaining about sexual harassment but unfairness. This is not protected activity under the FEHA."
The appellate court faulted plaintiffs for not having complained to defendants "that the affairs and related conduct created an
atmosphere whereby they felt they were being judged on their sexuality rather than on merit. Neither woman claimed to have been
propositioned by a supervisor, expressly or impliedly, or to have been the subject of unwanted sexual attention. Neither woman
claimed that the atmosphere had become so sexually charged that they could no longer do their work. Rather, plaintiffs' complaints
and reports concerned the unfairness of promotions and other benefits given to paramours and the resulting mistreatment of them by
those paramours." The Court of Appeal added that plaintiffs had not complained that they "were being forced to work in an
atmosphere where they had to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse or where they were judged on their sexuality rather than on the merits.
This is not a situation where plaintiffs honestly, but mistakenly, believed they were engaging in protected activity by reporting sexual
harassment. Plaintiffs did not even attempt to report sexual harassment."
We have concluded ante, contrary to the determination of the Court of Appeal, that the conduct plaintiffs complained of may
constitute sexual harassment [***821] in violation of the FEHA. We do not believe employees should be required to elaborate to
their employer on the legal theory underlying the complaints they are making, in order to be protected by the FEHA. (See Mayo v.
Gomez, suprCi, 40 F.3d at p. 985 [in analyzing retaliation claims, courts should recognize that plaintiffs have limited legal knowledge];
Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, 685 F.2d at p. 1157 ["It requires a certain sophistication for an employee to
recognize that an offensive employment practice may represent sex or race discrimination that is against the law"]; see also
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Dril1kwate[y. /)f)ion(¥t:;icj€;(;o[p.,$Uprifl,.2Q4[*47S]f.:?dat p.8Ei6 [although the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim based
upon isolated sexual favoritism did not survive summary judgment, her retaliation claim did-"[Union Carbide] is not free to retaliate
against plaintiff simply because she has failed to build her sex discrimination claim properly," and she was not required "to guess the
outcome of New Jersey law correctly"].) Furthermore, even if ultimately it is concluded defendants' conduct did not constitute a
violation of the FEHA, we are not persuaded by defendant's claim that only an employee's mistake of fact, and not a mistake of law,
may establish an employee's good faith but mistaken belief that he or she is opposing conduct prohibited by the FEHA. (See Moyo v.
Gor[II;?:, ;;UP(g, 4Q F.~d gtP,285 [the employee'S good faith "reasonable mistake may be one of fact or law"]; DrinkwiJter v. I)nioD.
(;<t[p[qe(;Qrp" WQr:q,~Q4 .f,:?I;Lgt p,8EiEi [sanctioning a retaliation claim in light of the plaintiff's reasonable belief concerning the
law].)
Particularly in view of the EEOC policy statement quoted at length ante, whether or not a jury or a court ultimately concludes
defendants' conduct constituted sexual harassment, employees such as plaintiffs reasonably could believe they are making a claim of
sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA when they complain of sexual favoritism in their workplace. Although plaintiffs may not
have recited the speCific words "sexual discrimination" or "sexual harassment," the nature of their complaint certainly fell within the
general purview of the FEHA, especially when we recall that this case is before us on review of a grant of summary judgment.
The FEHA's stricture against retaliation serves the salutary purpose of encouraging open communication between employees and
employers so that employers can take voluntary steps to remedy FEHA violations (Flait v. North American Watch Corp., supra, ~
Cg!.APpAtb gt p, 476), a result that will be achieved only if [**97] employees feel free to make complaints without fear of
retaliation. The FEHA should be liberally construed to deter employers from taking actions that would discourage employees from
bringing complaints that they believe to be well founded. The act would provide little comfort to employees, and thereby would fail in
its ameliorative purpose, if employees feared they lawfully could lose their employment or suffer other adverse action should they fail
to phrase accurately the legal theory underlying their complaint concerning behavior that may violate the act.
Similar concerns recently were expressed by the United States Supreme Court in commenting upon the need to protect
whistleblowers who complained that a recipient of federal education funding intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex. (JiJckson
V,. fJl[minghgm8q. of £qu~. (:?QQ;i}544J,.I.$,16I [161 t...Ec1.:?d3EiL 115 S. q. 1497J.) The court concluded that Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (:?J). U,S.C;:,§lEi8l.et~eq. [***822] (Title [*476] IX» provides the whistleblower with a private
right of action for retaliation. The high court, observing that Title IX would be unenforceable if persons feared retaliation in the event
they complained concerning discriminatory practices, stated: "Congress enacted Title IX not only to prevent the use of federal dollars
to support discriminatory practices, but also 'to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices.' [Citation.] We
agree with the United States that this objective 'would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex
discrimination did not have effective protection against retaliation: [Citation.] If recipients [of federal funds] were permitted to
retaliate freely, individuals who witness discrimination would be loathe to report it, and all manner of Title IX violations might go
unremedied as a result. [Citation.] [~] Reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement and would be
discouraged if retaliation against those who report went unpunished. Indeed, if retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX's enforcement
scheme would unravel." (JilC.!<;;Qnv.fJirmLnghgffi.fJetJ)! /;Q/,Jc"gJR[g,5'!4 U.S. !'It p. 180 U~5 S. Ct. at p. 1508].)
Defendants contend, and the Court of Appeal apparently concluded, that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that at the time of their
complaints they held a subjective, good faith belief that they were complaining about sexual harassment. They assume such a
subjective mental state must be demonstrated even when a plaintiff is not relying upon a good faith mistake. Whether or not this
assumption is accurate, we conclude that the subjective belief of the plaintiffs before us may be inferred from the nature and content
of their repeated complaints. The issue of a plaintiff'S subjective, good faith belief involves questions of credibility and ordinarily
cannot be reSOlved on summary judgment. (See, e.g., Flait v. North American Watch Corp., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 477.)
Because the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiffs failed to establish that they were engaged in protected activity when they
complained about potential sexual harassment, that court did not reach the question whether plaintiffs established a prima facie case
on the remaining elements of their retaliation claim-specifically, whether plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment action in
response to their sexual harassment complaints, and whether any adverse action was caused by their protected activity. • The court
also did not reach defendants' claim that plaintiffs failed to file their administrative complaint within the period established by law.
(See Gov. Code, § 129EiO, subd. (d) [plaintiffs must file their complaints with the FEHC within one year of the alleged unlawful
employment practice].) We conclude it is appropriate to [*477] permit the Court of Appeal to address these questions in the first
instance on remand.
FOOTNOTES
9 The only aspect of the Court of Appeal's discussion that pertained to the issue of causation concerned Miller's claim of retaliation
on the basis of her demand for disability accommodation.

IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent [* *98] it is inconSistent with our opinion,
and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings conSistent with this opinion.
Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA
LYNETTE PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE and
JOHN/JANE DOES I TlfROUGH X, whose
true identities are presently unknown,
Defendants.

)
) Case No. CV OC 07 17095
)
) DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
) RECONSIDERA TION OF ORDER
) GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
) ON PLAINTIFF'S IHRA CLAIM
)

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare ("IDHW"
or "the Department"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, and hereby submits its
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary Judgment on
PlaintifT's IHRA Claim ("Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.")

I.
INTRODUCTION
In her Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff Lynette Patterson requests that this Court
reconsider its Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

i
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("Memorandum Decision") of September 23, 2009,

in which this Court granted Defendant

IDHW's Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse its
dismissal of Plaintiff's claim of retaliation under the Idaho Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), Idaho
Code § 67-5901 et seq., arguing that "[t]here are factual disputes as to whether Defendant [sic]
undertook a 'protected activity,' as defined under Title VII and the IHRA ... and whether
Plaintiff held a reasonable, good faith belief that she was engaging in protected activity ..

""I

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3.
Defendant IDFfW respectfully asserts that this Court correctly ruled that Plaintiff did not
engage in a protected activity under the IBRA and that her claim under the IBRA was therefore
appropriately subject to dismissal as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. Memorandum Decision, pp. 17-20. As discussed in detail below, the federal
courts have overwhelmingly held that favoritism by a supervisor toward his or her paramour
does not constitute gender discrimination or sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 V.S.c. § 2000e et seq.. Because the Idaho courts look
to federal law in interpreting the provisions of the IHRA, Plaintiff was therefore not engaging in
a protected activity when she discussed her concerns regarding the alleged favoritism of her
supervisor, Mond Warren, toward a co-worker, Lori Stiles. purportedly stemming from a
consensual romantic relationship.2

In light of the voluminous legal precedent on the issue,

Plaintiffs alleged belief that she was engaging in a protected activity was not objectively
reasonable. The facts upon which Plaintiff relies do not demonstrate a genuine issue of material

Plaintiff has not moved for reconsideration of this Court's dismissal of her claim under the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, Idaho Code § 6-2101 et seq.. See Memorandum Decision, pp.
7-17; Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1.
2
Defendant IDHW denies the existence of the alleged favoritism, but acknowledges that Mr.
Warren and Ms. Stiles engaged in a consensual romantic relationship.
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
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fact regarding the question of the objective reasonableness of Plaintiffs purported belief. In
sum, Defendant IDHW respectfully requests that this Court affirm its Memorandum Decision.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests within the
discretion of the district court.

Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P .2d 107

(1999); Watson v. Navistar In1'l Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 654,827 P.2d 656,667 (1992).
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace
Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 206 P.3d 481,487 (Idaho 2009); see I.R.C.P. 56(c). The nonmoving
party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's
response. by at1idavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56 J must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). "lTJhe opposing party's case
must not rest on mere speculation. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
issue of fact." Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994).

II.
ARGUMENT

In its Memorandum Decision, this Court correctly held that Plaintiff did not engage in a
protected activity under the IHRA. Memorandum Decision, pp. 17-20. This Court's ruling is
supported by overwhelming case law and by the facts in the record - including the "new" facts
Plaintiff presents in conjunction with her Motion for Reconsideration. Accordingly, Plaintiff

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
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respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration and affirm its
prior ruling.

A.

Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Proving That She Engaged in a Protected Activity as
an Essential Element of a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation Under the IHRA
With respect to the IHRA, the Idaho Supreme Court has held: "The legislative intent

reHected in

I.e.

§ 67-5901 allows our state courts to look to federal law for guidance in the

interpretation of the state provisions." Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 925,
908 P.2d 1228, 1232 (1995); see also O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 811, 810 P.2d 1082,
1097 (1991).

Accordingly, as this Court noted in its Memorandum Decision, the Court's

interpretation of the IHRA's retaliation provisions is guided by federal case law regarding the
retaliation provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See Banks v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No.
25,429 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1200 n.3, 1203 (D.Idaho 2006); Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 812,
606 P.2d 458, 462 (1979); Memorandum Decision, p. 17.

To prevail on her retaliation claim

under the IHRA, Plaintiff must prove that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity under Idaho

Code § 67-5911; (2) IDHW subjected her to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link
existed between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action.

See Banks, 429

F.Supp.2d at 1203; Surrell v. Cal. Water Servo Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9

th

Cir. 2008);

Memorandum Decision, p. 17.
As discussed in further detail below, and as this Court correctly held in its Memorandum
Decision, Plaintiff did not engage in a protected activity under the IHRA. See Memorandum
Decision, pp. 17-20. Accordingly, the Court's decision to grant IDHW's Motion for Summary
Judgment was correct, because "the moving party is entitled to a judgment when the nonmoving
party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Baxter

V.

Craney, 135
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Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000); see also Memorandum Decision, p. 6, citing to Pounds
v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426 816 P2d 982, 983 (1991) (,'[T]he existence of disputed facts will
not defeat summary judgment when the Plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to his case .... ")

Plaintiff's failure to "make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence" of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the essential
element of her involvement in a protected activity under the IBRA renders summary judgment in
favor of Defendant IDHW wholly appropriate. rd.

B.

Plaintiff Did Not Engage in a Protected Activity Under the IHRA
In her Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff asserts:
There are factual disputes as to whether Defendant [sic] undertook a "protected
activity," as defined under Title VII and the IHRA and as interpreted by various
courts in reviewing claims brought pursuant to these statutes, and whether Plaintitf
held a reasonable, good faith belief that she was engaging in protected activity,
when she voiced concerns about the intra-office, romantic affair occurring
between Mond Warren and Lori Stiles in Defendant's workplace.

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3.
Plaintitf, seeking a second bite at the apple, asks the Court to revisit its evaluation of this
issue and attempts to demonstrate the existence of a factual issue by submitting a new Affidavit
from the Plaintiff

Notably, none of the information contained in the Affidavit of Lynette

Patterson in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff's IHRA Claim ("Plaintiff's Affidavit") involves "newly discovered
evidence."

See PlaintifT's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2 (Plaintiff asserting that

"[ r]econsideration is appropriate, if the district court ... is presented with newly discovered
evidence"); PlaintifT's Affidavit (discussing Plaintiff's involvement in activities that took place
between August 2004 and December 2006, well before the briefing on IDHW's Motion for
Summary Judgment.)

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
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Regardless, the facts to which Plaintiff points in support of her request that the Court
overturn its prior ruling do not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that
would warrant reversal of the Memorandum Decision. Plaintiff asserts that she subjectively
believed that the conduct at issue violated the IHRA, but this alleged belief was not, as a matter
of law, reasonable. The facts upon which Plaintiff relies do not create a factual issue regarding
the reasonableness of Plaintiffs purported belief, as discussed in greater detail below.
1.

Plaintiffs Purported Belief that the Conduct at Issue Violated the IHRA Was Not
Reasonable in Light of Overwhelming Case Law to the Contrary

Overwhelming case law supports the conclusion that favoritism displayed towards a
paramour in the workplace does not constitute sexual discrimination under Title VII - and thus
under the IHRA. In the face of this overwhelming case law, it was not reasonable, as a matter of
law, for Plaintiff to believe that such alleged conduct constituted unlawful activity under the
II-IRA.

a

Federal Courts Have Consistently Held that Favoritism of a Paramour
Does Nol Violale Title VII

As this Court stated in its Memorandum Decision: "Looking to federal law for guidance,
this Court notes 'the great majority of courts' have found that 'favoritism for a paramour by [a]
plaintiffs supervisor [does] not violate Title VII's prohibition of sexual discrimination."
Memorandum Decision, p. 18, quoting Womack v. Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298, l300-01 (11 th Cir.
1998). This Court continued: "[F]avoritism for a co-worker or the co-worker's unit arising out
of a sexual relationship is distinct from favoritism based on a preference for one sex or the other.
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination 'is based on a person's sex, not on his or her sexual
affiliations.' The Plaintiff appears to confuse two definitions of the word 'sex. '" Memorandum

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
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Decision, p. 19, quoTing DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d.
Cir. 1986).
Indeed, as the Court recognized, the overwhelming majority of federal courts have held
that favoritism of a paramour in the workplace does not violate Title V II, because both males and
females are equally affected by the alleged conduct (favoritism). As the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals explained, with respect to favoritism stemming from a consensual, romantic
relationship:
Ryan's conduct, although unfair, simply did not violate Title VII. Appellees
were not prejudiced because of their status as males; rather, they were
discriminated against because Ryan preferred his paramour. Appellees
faced exactly the same predicament as that faced by any woman applicant for
the promotion: No one but Guagenti could be considered for the appointment
because of Guagenti's special relationship to Ryan.
DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 307-08 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals similarly
held that:
Title VII does not, however, prevent employers from favoring employees
because of personal relationships. Whether the employer grants employment
perks to an employee because she is a protege, an old friend, a close relative or a
love interest, that special treatment is permissible as long as it is not based on an
impermissible classification. From a practical standpoint, there is every reason for
an employer to discourage this kind of intra-office romance, as it is often bad for
morale, but that is different from saying it violates Title VII. Had there been
other women in the sign shop, they would have suffered in exactly the same way
[the male plaintiff] was allegedly suffering, which also shows why this is not
really a sex discrimination problem.
Schobert v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733

(7th

Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)

(internal citation omitted). Other federal courts have uniformly applied the same reasoning and
holding: "[W]here an employee engages in consensual sexual conduct with a supervisor and an
employment decision is based on this conduct, Title VII is not implicated because any benefits
of the relationship are due to the sexual conduct, rather than the gender, of the employee."
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Tenge v. Phillips Modem Agric. Co., 446 FJd 903, 909 (8

th

Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see

also Preston v. Wis. Health Fund, 397 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2005) ('"Neither in purpose nor in
consequence can favoritism resulting from a personal relationship be equated to sex
discrimination."); DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306-07 (2d. Cir. 1986); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
679 F.Supp. 495, 501 (W.D.Pa. 1988), aff'd memo 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Becerra v.
Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4 th Cir. 1996); Ackel v. Nan Communications, Inc., 339 F.3d 376,
382 (5 th Cir. 2003); Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 752 F.Supp. 956, 960 (O.Nev.

1990), altd memo 975 F.2d 588 (9 th Cir. 1992); Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm 'n, 125 F.3d
1366, 1369-70 (loth Cir. 1997); Womack, 147 F.3d at 1300-01 (lIth Cir. 1998). "'Sex'"
discrimination means discrimination based on gender, not upon sexual activity or
relationships." Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
As one federal district court noted, in referencing many of the above-listed cases and
coming to the conclusion that a plaintiff could not bring a claim of Title VII sex discrimination
regarding the consensual intra-office affair of two co-workers:
In addition to this mound of caselaw on the matter, EEOC Policy Guidance
on Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism notes:
Not all types of sexual favoritism violate Title VII. It is the
Commission's position that Title VII does not prohibit isolated
instances of preferential treatment based upon consensual romantic
relationships. An isolated instance of favoritism toward a
"paramour" (or a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does
not discriminate against women or men in violation of Title
VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their
genders.
O'Patka v. Menasha Corp., 878 F.Supp. 1202, 1206 (E.D.Wis. 1995) (emphasis added), quoting
EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC
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Notice No. 915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990);3 see also

Womack,

147 FJd at 1300 (holding that paramour

favoritism does not violate Title VII and noting that the "Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which is charged with enforcing Title VII, has also reached the same conclusion.");
Memorandum Decision, p. 19.
The federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit,4 have repeatedly and overwhelmingly
held that favoritism stemming from a consensual romantic relationship does not constitute gender
discrimination or harassment under Title VII. This Court looks to federal law in interpreting the
provisions of the IHRA; accordingly, favoritism towards a paramour similarly does not violate
the IHRA. See Banks, 429 F.Supp.2d at 1200 n.3 and 1203; Bowles, 100 Idaho at 812, 606 P.2d
at 462: Memorandum Decision, p. 17.

b.

Overwhelming Case Law Regarding Paramour Favoritism Renders
Plaintiff's Purported Belief that Such Conduct Violated the IflRA
Unreasonable as a Matter of Law

Because the conduct at issue did not violate the IHRA, Plaintiff's alleged complaints
about such conduct did not constitute a protected activity under the IHRA.

PlaintitT must

demonstrate that she "opposed any practice made unlawful by [the IHRAJ or . . . made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or
litigation under [the IHRA]."

I.e. § 67-5911

(emphasis added). As the federal courts have held

with respect to retaliation under Title VII: "The mere fact that an employee is participating in an
investigation ... does not automatically trigger the protection atTorded under [Title VII]; the

underlying discrimination must be reasonably perceived as discrimination prohibited by
Title VII." Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 (9 th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).

EEOC Notice 915-048 can be viewed at the EEOC's website at:
bttp:llwww&eoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (last visited on Nov. 20, 2009.)
4 See Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 752 F.Supp. 956, 960 (D.Nev. 1990), afTd
memo 975 F.2d 588 (9 th Cir. 1992)
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
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As this Court recognized, "[a] plaintiff may make aprimajacie showing on the protected
activity element by demonstrating she held a reasonable, good faith belief she was engaging in
protected activity, even if she was in fact not." Memorandum Decision, p. 18. The key term for
purposes of this Court's analysis of the current situation is "reasonable." PlaintitT "must not only
show that [s]he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that [her] employer was engaged in
unlawful employment practices, but also that [her] belief was objectively reasonable in light of
the facts and record presented." Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11 th Cir. 1997). As
this Court correctly held, Plaintiffs purported belief that she was engaging in a protected activity
when she discussed her concerns regarding Mr. Warren's consensual romantic relationship with
Ms. Stiles was not objectively reasonable as a matter of law. Memorandum Decision, pp. 18-19.
In her Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff asserts that "[i]ssues of reasonableness are
most commonly reserved for the jury to decide and are not typically resolved appropriately at the
summary judgment stage ofa litigation." Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3. The cases
to which Plaintiff cites, however, do not involve the question of reasonableness in the context of
a Title VII or II-IRA retaliation claim (i.e. the reasonableness of the plaintiff's belief that he or
she was engaging in a protected activity.) See id. The concept of reasonableness is not an
automatic ticket to get a plaintiff's case to a jury, as Plaintiff asserts, particularly in light of the
record presented here.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the federal courts, to which this Court turns for guidance
in interpreting claims raised under the IHRA, have regularly decided as a matter of law the issue
of reasonableness of a plaintiffs belief that he or she was engaging in protected activity under
Title VII. See, e.g., Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nfl Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 291-92 (2d.
Cir. 1998) (upholding district court's dismissal pursuant to a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
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Law); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707

(7th

Cir. 2000)

(upholding judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't
Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388

(lIth

Cir. 1988) (upholding district court's dismissal pursuant to a

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss); Ross v. City of Perry, Ga., 2009 WL 3190450 (M.D.Ga.
2009) (granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment); Adams v. Giant Food, Inc., 225
F.Supp.2d 600, 605-06 (D.Md. 2002) (granting defendant's Motion for Summary judgment).
Even the United States Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth Circuit and upholding the district
court's dismissal of a case pursuant to the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, held as a
matter of law that "no reasonable person could have believed" that the conduct at issue in that
case "violated Title VII's standard." Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,269-71
(2001).

In the case at hand, the Court's determination as a matter of law that Plaintiff's

purported belief was not reasonable was proper and in accordance with the federal courts that
have addressed similar issues as a matter of law.
In light of the "mound of caselaw on the matter," as one district court appropriately
described precedential authority on the issue of paramour favoritism, Plaintiffs belief that Mr.
Warren's alleged favoritism of Ms. Stiles violated the IHRA was not reasonable. O'Patka, 878
F.Supp. at 1206. "The objective reasonableness of an employee's belief that her employer has
engaged in an unlawful employment practice must be measured against existing substantive law."
Clover v. Total Svs. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (1 I th Cir. 1999). In rejecting the argument
that plaintitTs should not be "charged with substantive knowledge of the law," the Eleventh
Circuit held: "If the plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the
reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding their subjective knowledge,"
noting that "it would eviscerate the objective component of our reasonableness inquiry." Harper,
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139 F.3d at 1388 n.2. In this case, "Plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that her employer
had violated the law. First, the unanimity with which the courts have declared favoritism of
a paramour to be gender-neutral belies the reasonableness of Plaintiff's belief that such
favoritism created a hostile work environment." Sherk v. Adesa Atlanta, LLC, 432 F.Supp.2d
1358, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Harper, 139 F.3d at l388 (holding that
"'it is insutlicient for a plaintitT to allege his belief ... was honest and bona tide; the allegations
and record must also indicate that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was objectively
reasonable.' The reasonableness of the plaintiffs' belief in this case is belied by the unanimity
with which the courts have declared ... policies like Blockbuster's nondiscriminatory.")
(emphasis added), quoting Little, 103 F.3d at 960; Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Luce, Hamilton, Forward & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1006 (9 th Cir. 2002) ("In the face of
voluminous contrary legal precedent, Lagatree could not have reasonably believed Luce
Fonvard was engaged in unlawful activity .... ") (emphasis added).
As the Seventh Circuit held:
The plaintiff must not only have a subjective (sincere, good faith) belief that he
opposed an unlawful practice; his belief must also be objectively reasonable,
which means that the complaint must involve discrimination that is
prohibited by Title VII. ... Hamner's allegations cannot be without legal
foundation, but must concern the type of activity that, under some circumstances,
supports a charge of sexual harassment. If a plaintiff opposed conduct that was
not proscribed by Title VII, no matter how frequent or severe, then his
sincere belief that he opposed an unlawful practice cannot be reasonable. As
the law stands, the harassment that he opposed did not violate Title VII.
Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Similarly, a federal district court stated:
In conclusion, we again hold that because Title VII does not prohibit a
supervisor from giving preferential treatment to a supervisee with whom she
has a relationship, Horn could not have reasonably believed that the alleged
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affair he reported violated Title VII. Consequently, Horn cannot state a cause of
action for retaliation under a theory of workplace favoritism.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 2006 WL 2024240,
*5 (N.D.!I!. 2006) (emphasis added).
In the present case, "voluminous contrary legal precedent" has held that favoritism
stemming from a consensual intra-office romance does not constitute unlawful discrimination or
harassment.

Luce, Hamilton, Forward & Scripps, 303 F.3d at 1006.

In light of this legal

precedent, Plaintiffs belief to the contrary was "without legal foundation" and therefore was not
objectively reasonable. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707.
Perhaps more important is the nature of the alleged conduct that Plaintiff purportedly
opposed in this case. The record is replete with evidence demonstrating that the conduct Plaintiff
opposed was Mond Warren's alleged favoritism of Lori Stiles and the SUR Unit over Plaintiff
and her Fraud Unit. Both the Fraud and SUR Units consists of both male and female employees.
The depositions 5 of male and female employees from both units are in the record for the very
purpose of their testimony regarding the romantic affair and the issue of whether they perceived
Mr. Warren as favoring one unit. The Court in its Memorandum Decision articulated the heart of
this issue when it stated: "In fact, common sense dictates that any adverse action stemming from
the atTair and favoritism of the SUR Unit would have fallen upon male and female fraud
investigators alike." Memorandum Decision, p. 19. The very nature of the conduct opposed by
Plaintiff in this case is gender neutral, and no reasonable person could conclude that the alleged
favoritism was based on gender or sex discrimination or harassment.
III

5 See Depositions of Paula Hisle-Culet (Fraud Investigator); Greg Snider (SUR Unit); Susan Slade-Grossi
(Fraud Unit); Lori Stiles (SUR Unit); Dwayne Sanders (Fraud Unit); Plaintiff (Fraud Unit).
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2.

The Facts Presented by Plaintiff Do Not Demonstrate the Existence of a Genuine
Issue of Material Fact Regarding the Question of the Objective Reasonableness of
PlaintitI's Purported Belief

In support of her Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit setting
forth several "new" facts that she alleges demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the issue of whether she believed that she was engaging in a protected activity under the IHRA
when she discussed concerns about alleged favoritism stemming from Mr. Warren's and Ms.
Stiles' consensual romantic relationship.

However, none of the facts set forth in PlaintifT's

Affidavit demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the question of
whether Plaintiff's belief that the alleged favoritism violated the IHRA was objectively
reasonable.
a.

Workplace Training Received by Plaintiff

Plaintiff first asserts that she attended "Respectful Workplace Training" in August 2004
and that, based upon the training materials distributed to employees, she "was left with the clear
impression that Mond Warren's intra-office, romantic affair with Lori Stiles amounted to a
hostile work environment." Plaintiff's Affidavit,

'1'1

2-3.

A review of the training materials

referenced by Plaintiff, however, reveals that this interpretation of the materials is not objectively
reasonable. Plaintiff's AfIidavit, Ex. 1. The materials, in fact, clarify, consistent with federal
case law, that:
Sexual harassment at work occurs whenever unwelcome conduct on the basis of
gender affects a person's job. It is defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when ... such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment. "
. .. The second kind of sexual harassment is called "hostile environment." A
supervisor, co-worker, or someone else with whom the victim comes in contact on
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the job creates an abusive work environment or interferes with the employee's
work performance through words or deeds because o/the victim's gender.
Plaintiff's Affidavit, Ex. 1, p. 1 (some emphasis added).
As one federal district court held, with respect to a case of alleged paramour favoritism:
"Because Plaintiff has introduced no evidence that he was subjected to the alleged hostility

because of his gender and in fact testified that Weber's comments were not directed specifically
towards men or women, he could not have reasonably believed that Weber's alleged conduct
violated Title VII." Drummond v. IPC In1'l, Inc., 400 F.Supp.2d 521, 534 (E.D.N. Y. 2005)
(emphasis added). Similarly, another federal district court held:
Plaintiff's exposure to the Christian-Rioux relationship was not based on her
gender. All employees at American Baby were equally subjected to this personal
relationship .... [E]mployees exposed to the intimate relationship of a supervisor
are not discriminated against because of their gender, but rather they are
discriminated against because their supervisor prefer[s] his paramour.

Under the totality of circumstances in this case, a reasonable juror could not
find that Plaintiff had a good faith, reasonable belief that her employer had
engaged in conduct creating a hostile work environment.
Gale v. Primedia, Inc., 2001 WL 1537692, *3-4 (S.D.N.V. 2001) (emphasis added) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has pointed to absolutely no facts that demonstrate that she believed - whether
subjectively or objectively

that the alleged favoritism at issue was due to Plaintifrs gender.

Instead, Plaintiff has consistently acknowledged that she complained of alleged preferential
treatment based upon Mr. Warren's sporadic romantic relationship with Ms. Stiles.
Amended Complaint,

See

'1 14; 6/15/09 Affidavit of Brian Benjamin ("Benjamin Affidavit"), Ex.

I

(Plaintiff's Deposition), p. 30. Plaintiff even explicitly admitted this was the case in her briefing
on IDHW's Motion for Summary Judgment, stating: "PlaintitT made numerous internal
complaints about the affair and the preferential treatment that was occurring as a result of the

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TlON OF ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S IHRA CLAIM - 15

00823

affair." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 9 (emphasis added). "PlaintifI has not alleged any facts that would lead a reasonable person in
her position to infer that her gender, as opposed to favoritism for a paramour motivated the
harassment she [allegedly] experienced." Gale, 2001 WL 1537692, *4. Therefore, "a reasonable
person would not conclude that any harassment occurred because of her gender." Id. (emphasis
added).
Plaintiffs alleged mistaken impression that the conduct at issue involved a "hostile work
environment" under the IHRA was not a reasonable conclusion, as there is no factual dispute that
Plaintiffs concerns stemmed from conduct that was not due to her gender. This is particularly so
in light of the voluminous case law on the issue, as discussed above, which clearly holds more
authoritative weight than any materials dispensed at an employee training. As noted above, the
materials to which Plaintiff points do not lead to the reasonable conclusion that the alleged
conduct at issue could violate Title VII. Regardless, however, the federal courts have clarified
that an employer's sexual harassment policy or materials that are more restrictive than Title VII
do not lead to a reasonable belief on the part of an employee that the conduct violates Title VII:
PlaintifI argues that she had an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Rush's
conduct violated the law because "Defendant's own ethics handbook makes the
causal connection between sexual relationships . . . and the resultant sexual
harassment" . . . Both these arguments fail, however, because Plaintiff is
charged with knowledge of the substantive law. Armed with clear holdings
from the Eleventh Circuit as well as numerous other courts that favoritism is
gender-neutral, a reasonable person would not conclude that her supervisor's
favoritism for his paramour violated Title VII because her employer had
adopted a more restrictive policy in its ethics handbook ....
. . . Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would lead a reasonable person in her
position to infer that her gender, as opposed to favoritism for a paramour,
motivated the harassment she experienced .... [AJ reasonable person would not
conclude that any harassment occurred because of her gender.
Sherk, 432 F.Supp.2d at 1372 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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b.

Plaintiff's Discussions with Representatives of Human Resources

Plaintiff next alleges that she "had discussions with representatives of Defendant's
Human Resources Division which reasonably led her to believe that the affair and the preferential
treatment violated the law." Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5. Specifically, PlaintitI
alleges that when Heidi Graham (formerly Heidi Gordon) met with Plaintiff in December 2004
during the investigation into alleged favoritism, Ms. Graham purportedly told Plaintiff that she
"was looking into potential violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Plaintiff's
Affidavit,

'1 4.

Plaintiff further alleges that Monica Young told Plaintiff in January 2005 that

Plaintiff could contact the Idaho Division of Human Resources C'DHR") if she was "not happy
with the findings" of the investigation, while, according to

Plaintiff~

"Ms. Graham also stated that

contacting the IDHR was another option for me" in April 2005. rd. at

'['1 5-6.

Plaintiff describes

her resulting leap of logic: "My understanding from this . . . was that the affair and the
preferential treatment were clearly human resources issues that were within the legal area of
sexual harassment." rd. at

~

6. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that between March 2005 and August

2005, she had discussions with Bethany Zimmerman during which Ms. Zimmerman "mentioned
hostile work environment was clearly a violation of the law." Id. at '18.
Even if the above factual allegations were true, they do not demonstrate any genuine issue
as to the question of the reasonableness of PlaintifTs belief that the conduct at issue violated the
!HRA. The mere fact that Ms. Graham may have made the general statement that she "was
looking into potential violations of Title VII" during her investigation does not mean that any
actual violation was discovered through the investigation - or that all conduct reviewed as part of
the investigation even involved potential violations.

Similarly, Ms. Zimmerman's alleged,

general statement that "hostile work environment was clearly a violation of the law" would not
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reasonably lead to the conclusion that the particular alleged conduct at issue actually
constituted a "hostile work environment" under Title VII or the IHRA.
Regardless, Plaintiff cannot base her claim that she held a reasonable belief that the
conduct violated the ll-IRA upon a third party's stated belief.

As one federal district court

articulated:
Plaintiff argues that he can establish that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that
the t-shirt incident was an unlawful employment practice because at the time he
delivered the grievance, he believed Ms. Kitchens found the t-shirt incident to be
an unlawful employment practice, to wit, sexual harassment. Essentially, PlaintitT
argues that he can establish a statutorily protected expression based on his good
faith belief that a third party believed the employment practice to be
unlawful. Plaintiff, however, provides no legal authority for such a
proposition, and the Court could find no such authority on its own initiative..
. . The Court can find no legal authority to support Plaintiffs claim that he
can establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the opposition clause if he
shows that he had a good faith belief in another's good faith belief that their
employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices.
Ross v. City of Perry, Ga., 2009 WL 3190450 at

* 13 (emphasis added).

In other words, even if

Ms. Graham or Ms. Zimmerman had explicitly stated that they believed the alleged conduct
unequivocally involved a Title VII violation (which is far more specific than what PlaintitT
alleges Ms. Graham and Ms. Zimmerman actually stated), Plaintiff cannot establish aprimafacie
case of retaliation merely by "show[ing] that [s ]he had a good faith belief in another's good faith
belief that their employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices." Id.
Even more of a stretch is Plaintiff s assertion that Ms. Young's and Ms. Graham's
statements that she could contact the Division of Human Resources about the findings of the
investigation led to her "understanding ... that the affair and the preferential treatment were
clearly human resources issues that were within the legal area of sexual harassment." Plaintiff's
Affidavit,

,,6. Not all "human resources issues" involve "issues that [are] within the legal area of

sexual harassment." Id. Indeed, DHR is a state agency that deals with a multitude of human
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resources issues, including employee compensation and benefits, hiring practices, oversight of
the Idaho Personnel Commission (which hears appeals by classified State employees unrelated to
alleged discrimination or harassment), employee performance evaluations, and consultation
regarding general employee relations issues, to name a few. 6 Notably, Plaintiff does not allege
that she actually contacted DHR or that she had a real understanding of DHR's general role. See
Plaintiff's Affidavit,

"r 5-6.

Instead, she concluded, without a reasonable basis, that all matters

involving DHR must somehow involve "issues ... within the legal area of sexual harassment."

liL at '1 6. A mere referral to DHR, which deals with multiple employee issues unrelated to
harassment or discrimination, does not support Plaintiffs alleged belief that the conduct at issue
violated the IBRA.

c.

Plaintiff's Legal Research

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she "performed her own legal research into whether the
afTair and preferential treatment violated the law, and she was left with that specific impression
after reading certain legal precedents on her own." Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 6.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she "started researching on [her] own the court cases regarding
sexual harassment and hostile work environment" on April 5, 2005. Plaintiff's Atlidavit,

,r 7.

"On December 20, 2006, [she] came across the California Supreme Court case of Miller v.
Department of Corrections," the only legal precedent Plaintiff appears to have discovered in
purported support of her position.

Id. at

,r

9.

Plaintiff does not allege that she found legal

precedent in support of her position prior to December 20, 2006, despite having conducted
research on the subject for nearly two years. Id. at

,r, 7, 9.

This is not particularly surprising,

given the voluminous case law contrary to her position, which common sense dictates she must
have encountered during her lengthy research. See pp. 6-12, above.

6

See DHR's website at: http://www.dhr.idaho.gov/(last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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The timing of Plaintiff's discovery of the Miller case on December 20,2006 is signiticant.
Plaintiff participated in the Human Resources investigation into Mr. Warren's and Ms. Stiles'
relationship in December 2004.

Plaintiff's Affidavit,

~

4; Statement of Undisputed Facts in

SUppOI1 of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Statement of Facts"),

~1

6.

Plaintiff discussed her concerns regarding the relationship with Heidi Graham in the spring of
2005 and asserts that she also discussed the relationship with Bethany Zimmerman" [b Jetween
March 2005 and August 2005." Plaintiff's Affidavit,

~~

6, 8; Defendant's Statement of Facts,

'i

13. Finally, in September 2006, Plaintiff expressed her concerns regarding the relationship to the
new Director of IDHW, Richard Armstrong. Defendant's Statement of Facts,

'114.

Notably, all

of these conversations took place prior to December 20, 2006. Plaintiff therefore had not yet
reviewed the Miller case at the time she claims to have held a "reasonable" belief that she was
engaging in a protected activity by expressing her concerns.
"The plaintiff must ... at a minimum have held a reasonable good faith belief at the time

IsJhe opposed an employment practice that the practice was violative of Title VII." Adams,
225 F.Supp.2d at 606 (emphasis added). Plaintiff, however, alleges:

On December 20, 2006, I came across the California Supreme Court case of
Miller v. Department of Corrections. After reading this case, I was convinced that
I had a strong case for sexual harassment and hostile work environment as a result
of the intra-office, romantic affair that was occurring between Mond Warren and
Lori Stiles. To this point in time, I knew it was not right for Defendant to allow
Mond Warren to continue to supervise both Lori Stiles and me, with the affair
ongoing and preferential treatment being afforded Lori Stiles and the SUR Unit
she supervised. However, once I read the Miller case, it was my impression and
belief that the affair and preferential treatment were illegal, were violations of
Title VII and the Idaho Human Rights Act, and were resulting in illegal retaliation
against me.
Plaintiff's Affidavit,

~

9 (emphasis added). In other words, Plaintiff herself acknov.dedges that

while she only subjectively believed that the consensual relationship between Mr. Warren and
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Ms. Stiles "was not right" at the time she expressed her concerns, it was not until after finding
the Miller case - and thus after she had already engaged in the alleged "protected activity" - that
she developed her belief that the conduct was illegal.

Id.

This does not demonstrate an

objectively reasonable belief that the conduct was unlawful "at the time [s]he opposed [the]
employment practice." Adams, 225 F.Supp.2d at 606.
Regardless, the Miller case does not support a reasonable belief that the alleged conduct
in this case involved a violation of the IHRA. First, Miller is markedly distinguishable from the
case at hand.

Miller involved "widespread sexual favoritism," rather than a single, isolated

workplace relationship. Miller v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 94 (Cal. 2005). In the Miller
case, the warden of the facility where the plaintiffs worked, Mr. Kuykendall, was having sexual
affairs with three subordinates - Ms. Brown, Ms. Bibb, and Ms. Patrick - whom Mr. Kuykendall
blatantly promoted, and "there were widespread rumors that sexual affairs between subordinates
and their superior officers were 'common practice in the Department of Corrections' and that
there were rumors that employees ... secured promotion this way." Id. at 81-82. Employees
witnessed Mr. Kuykendall fondling Ms. Bibb on several occasions, and a different employee
complained that he "had put his arms around her and another employee and made unwelcome
groping gestures." Id. at 83. The women with whom Mr. Kuykendall was having affairs also
"squabbled over him, sometimes in emotional scenes witnessed by other employees." Id. In
addition, one of the plaintiffs, Ms. Miller, found that her access to the warden was blocked when
she refused the apparent romantic advances of the female chief deputy warden, Ms. Yamamoto,
who was additionally rumored to be engaged in a romantic relationship with Ms. Brown, one of
the female subordinates with whom the warden was also involved. Id. Ms. Brown, in fact,
"physically assaulted Miller, holding her captive for two hours" after Ms. Miller "threatened to
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make a public announcement concerning the affair between Brown and Kuykendall."

~

Mr.

Kuykendall, in turn, complained to Plaintiff Miller of Ms. Brown's "untrustworthiness" and
hinted to Ms. Miller that he should have instead pursued a romantic relationship with her. Id at

84.
In light of the maelstrom of varIOUS intra-office relationships occurnng between
supervisors and subordinates, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether plaintiffs could establish a claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act noting:

IPllaintiffs in the present case alleged far more than that a supervisor
engaged in an isolated workplace sexual affair and accorded special benefits
to a sexual partner. They proffered evidence demonstrating the effect of
widespread favoritism on the work environment, namely the creation of an
atmosphere that was demeaning to women .
. . . There was evidence of considerable flaunting of the relationships affecting the
workplace, consisting of Bibb's and Brown's bragging and the jealous scenes
between these two women, along with Kuykendall's indiscreet behavior at a
number of work-related social gatherings. The favoritism that ensued from the
sexual affairs also was on public display, reflected in Kuykendall's permitting
Brown to abuse plaintiffs, his directive to the interview committee to promote
Bibb, and his repeated admissions that he would not or could not control Brown
because of his sexual relationship with her. It may even be inferred that
Kuykendall solicited sexual favors in return for employment benefits, in light of
Bibb's and Brown's boasts, the sequence of promotions awarded by Kuykendall,
and his comment to Miller, "I should have chose[n] you."
... Certainly, the presence of mere office gossip is insufficient to establish the
existence of widespread sexual favoritism, but the evidence of such favoritism in
the present case includes admissions by the participants concerning the nature of
the relationships, boasting by the favored women, eyewitness accounts of
incidents of public fondling, repeated promotion despite lack of qualifications, and
Kuykendall's admission he could not control Brown because of his sexual
relationship with her ....
Id. at 93-94, 97 (emphasis added).
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In contrast, the present case involves a single, consensual romantic relationship. As one
court explained in a similar situation:
The court disagrees that plaintiff has alleged the "widespread favoritism"
necessary to rise to the level of an actionable hostile work environment claim.
Among other reasons, during her employment with defendant, plaintiff witnessed
favoritism by a single supervisor toward a single employee. In order for
widespread favoritism to constitute a hostile work environment, courts
require plaintiffs to show that multiple supervisors engaged in the
challenged conduct. McGinnis v. Union Pacific Railroad, 496 F.3d 868, 874 (8 th
Cir. 2007) ("A single allegation against (a supervisor] cannot constitute
widespread sexual favoritism."); Bartniak v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 223
F.Supp.2d 524, 532 (SD.N.Y. 2002) ("Widespread favoritism refers to an
environment where multiple supervisors are engaging in the behavior .... ")
Ahem v. Omnicare ESC LLC, 2009 WL 2591230, *7 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (emphasis added).
Unlike Miller, this case involves exactly the type of isolated alleged favoritism that the federal
courts have repeatedly held does not constitute a violation of Title VII and that the Miller court
itself recognized as distinguishable from the "widespread sexual favoritism" at issue in Miller:
the simple allegation "that a supervisor engaged in an isolated workplace sexual affair and
accorded special benelits to a sexual partner." Miller, 115 P.3d at 93; see also ProkseI v. Gattis,
49 Cal.Rptr.2d 322, 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (other case law from California recognizing that
.,[ w)here ... there is no conduct other than favoritism toward a paramour, the overwhelming
weight of authority holds that no claim of sexual harassment or discrimination exists" and
holding: "[W]e agree with the weight of authority that it would be both impracticable and
unwarranted for the courts to assume a generalized police power over intimate consensual
relationships between co-employees.")
What is noticeably different in the Miller case, as opposed to the case at hand, is the fact
that not only was the favoritism widespread, it was pervasive and severe on the basis of gender.
As discussed above, the alleged favoritism of Ms. Stiles and the SUR Unit in this case equally
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afTected both men and women in the Fraud Unit, and there was no connection to gender or sex
discrimination or any other violation of the IHRA.
In sum, the fact that Plaintiff engaged in legal research on the issue between at least April
2005 and December 2006 indicates that she should have been aware of the extensive case law
that would dispel any reasonable belief that isolated favoritism toward a paramour violated the
IHRA. Regardless, Plaintiff is charged with substantive knowledge of the law with respect to the
issue of whether her belief was objectively reasonable. The sole case Plaintiff discovered in
attempted support of her alleged belief does not, in fact, support a reasonable conclusion that Mr.
WalTen's relationship with Ms. Stiles violated the IHRA.

Instead, the Miller case is easily

distinguishable from the case at hand, as even the Miller court itself recognized. 7 In the face of
the overwhelming weight of authority contrary to Plaintiffs position, Plaintiffs purported belief
that the alleged conduct at issue in this case violated the IHRA was not objectively reasonable.

IV.
CONCLUSION
This Court correctly held, in its Memorandum Decision, that Plaintiff did not engage in a
protected activity under the IHRA. The federal courts have held that favoritism by a supervisor
toward a paramour does not constitute sexual discrimination under Title VII, because it is not
based upon gender. In light of the voluminous legal authority on the issue, Plaintiff s purported
belief to the contrary was not objectively reasonable, and thus Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
she held the requisite good faith, reasonable belief that the alleged conduct in this case violated
the lHRA..

7

FUl1hermore, the Idaho courts have held that the courts may look to federal case law and Title

VII in interpreting the provisions of the IHRA. The Miller case is not a federal case, but is instead a
California Supreme Court case, examining the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.
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Plaintiff has pointed to no genuine issue of material fact regarding the question of the
objective reasonableness of her belief.

Even if all the facts upon which Plaintiff relies are

accepted as true, Plaintiffs belief was not objectively reasonable, as a matter of law.
Significantly, Plaintiff does not dispute that the concerns she expressed stemmed from her
perception that Mr. Warren was displaying favoritism toward Ms. Stiles and the SUR Unit
because of their consensual romantic relationship. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that she
complained about "[t]he preferential treatment of Lori [Stiles] by Mond [WarrenJ and the fact
that there was a relationship going on and that was the basis for preferential treatment and
inability for other people to go to Mond with any concerns or problems with Lori." Benjamin
Affidavit., Ex. 1, p. 30 (Plaintiff's Deposition) (emphasis added). Plaintiff points to no facts that
would support the conclusion that she raised complaints or expressed concerns based upon her
gender.

PlaintifT's alleged mistaken impression that favoritism based upon a consensual

romantic relationship violated Title VII and the IHRA was simply not reasonable as a matter of
law. "If a plaintiff opposed conduct that was not proscribed by Title VII, no matter how frequent
or how severe, then h[ er] sincere belief that rs]he opposed an unlawful practice cannot be
reasonable." Hamner, 224 FJd at 707.
/1/
/1/
/1/
/1/
/1/
1//

III
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For the reasons set forth above, as well as the arguments expressed in Defendant IDHW's
prior brieting on its Motion for Summary Judgment, IDHW respectfully requests that this Court
affirm its Memorandum Decision, which correctly granted IDHW's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2009.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Deputy Attorneys General
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For Defendants: Brian Benjamin, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General

18

19
20

PROCEEDINGS

This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration

21

of Order Granting Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's IHRA Claim.

22

argument, the Court took the matter under advisement.

23

After hearing

For the reasons discussed

below, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion.

24

LEGAL STANDARD
25

A motion for reconsideration of an order granting summary judgment can be
26
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made prior to entry of final judgment.
2

I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(8); Puckett v. Verska, 144

Idaho 161, 166, 158 P.3d 937, 942 (2007). A party may submit new evidence with the

3

motion for reconsideration but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho

4

468,473, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. App. 2006). A decision to grant or deny a motion for

5

reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Van v. Portneuf Med.

6

etr., 147 Idaho 552, _,212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009).

7

Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, and

8

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
9

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
10

matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial
11

12

court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-moving party and draw all

13

reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowner's

14

Ass'n. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho 343,346,796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). The

15

motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or "if

16

reasonable people might reach different conclusions." Parker v. Kokot, 117 Idaho 963,

17

966, 793 P.2d 195, 199 (1990).

18

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
19

rests with the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 531,
20

21
22

887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994).

If the moving party meets that burden, the party who

resists summary judgment has the responsibility to place in the record before the court

23

the existence of controverted material facts that require resolution at trial. Sparks v. St.

24

Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 508, 768 P.2d 768, 771 (1988).

25

resisting party may not rely on his pleadings nor merely assert the existence of facts

The

26
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.1

which might support his legal theory. Id. He must establish the existence of those facts
2

by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise. Id.; I.R.C.P. 56(e). A mere scintilla of evidence or

3

a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

4

Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85,87,730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). In other

5

words, there must be evidence on which a jury might rely. Petricevich v. Salmon River

6

Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362, 368 (1969). Moreover, the existence of

7

disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a

8

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on
9

which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426,
10
11

816 P.2d 982, 983 (1991).
DISCUSSION

12
13

The Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its Order Granting Summary Judgment

14

in favor of the Defendant on the Plaintiff's retaliation claim under the Idaho Human

15

Rights Act (lHRA).

16

regarding whether she engaged in a "protected activity" under the IHRA, or at least had

17

The Plaintiff contends there are genuine issues of material fact

a reasonable, good faith belief she was engaging in protected activity, when she voiced

18

opposition to Mr. Warren's and Ms. Stiles' affair and Mr. Warren's alleged acts of
19

favoritism towards Ms. Stiles and the SUR Unit at the Idaho Department of Health and
20

Welfare (lDHW). In support of this argument, the Plaintiff submits new evidence via
21

22

23

affidavit. 1
First, the Plaintiff points to a "Respectful Workplace Training" she attended in

24

25
26

1 The factual background of this case is found in the Court's Memorandum Decision of September 23,
2009 and will not be repeated here.
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,I
August of 2004.
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12

13

At this training, the Plaintiff received a handout, which included the

following excerpts:
Sexual harassment at work occurs whenever unwelcome conduct on the
basis of gender affects a person's job. It is defined by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as "unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individuals work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
... The second kind of sexual harassment is called "hostile environment."
A supervisor, co-worker, or someone else with whom the victim comes in
contact on the job creates an abusive work environment or interferes with
the employee's work performance through words or deeds because of the
victim's gender. A sexually hostile work environment can be created by:
. . . granting job favors to those who participate in consensual sexual
activity . ... n
Plaintiff's Affidavit, Ex. 1, p. 1 (some emphasis added).

Based on these training

materials, the Plaintiff was "left with the clear impression that Mond Warren's intraoffice, romantic affair with Lori Stiles amounted to a hostile work environment."

14

Second, the Plaintiff points to conversations with persons in the Human
15

Resources department that led her to believe the affair and alleged favoritism violated
16
17

the law. For example, Ms. Graham purportedly told Plaintiff that she "was looking into

18

potential violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."

19

Zimmerman said a "hostile work environment was clearly a violation of the law."

20

Plaintiff states via affidavit that her "understanding from this ... was that the affair and

21

the preferential treatment were clearly human resources issues that were within the

22

legal area of sexual harassment."

23

Additionally, Ms.
The

Third, the Plaintiff submits she conducted legal research into whether the affair

24

and preferential treatment violated the law and discovered Miller v. State Department of
25

Corrections on December 20, 2006. The Plaintiff felt after reading Miller that she had "a
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION - CASE NO. CVOC0717095 - PAGE 4

00838
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strong case of sexual harassment and hostile work environment as a result of the intra2

office, romantic affair that was occurring between Mond Warren and Lori Stiles."

3

Additionally, the Plaintiff had an "impression and belief that the affair and preferential

4

treatment were illegal, were violations of Title VII and the Idaho Human Rights Act .... "

5

Resting on this new evidence and the record before the Court on the

6

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider

7

8

its decision. For the following reasons, the Court declines to do so.
The IHRA makes it unlawful for an employer "because of, or on a basis of, race,

9

color, religion, sex or national origin ... to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or to
10

otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms,
11
12

conditions or privileges of employment or to reduce the wage of any employee in order
I.C. § 67-5909.

13

to comply with this chapter."

14

against an individual for having "opposed any practice made unlawful by this chapter or

15

because such individual has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any

16

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter." I.C. § 67-5911.

17
18

The statute also prohibits retaliation

The clear purpose of the IHRA is to "provide for execution within the state of the
policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... " I.C. § 67-5901(1); Foster

19

v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 925, 908 P.2d 1228, 1232 (1995). For that
20

reason, Idaho courts consider federal law for guidance in interpreting the IHRA. Foster,
21

22

127 Idaho at 925, 908 P.2d at 1232 (citing O'Oell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 811 , 810

23

P.2d 1082, 1097 (1991)); Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 811, 606 P.2d 458, 461

24

(1979) (noting the IHRA is a "parallel state statute to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

25

1964."). Under Title VII, a plaintiff states a prima facie case of retaliation by showing

26
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"(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action;
2

and (3) there was a causal connection between the two."

3

Servo Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008 ) (citing Bergene V. Salt River Project Agr.

4

Improvement and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2001»; see also Banks

5

V.

6

adopts this federal framework in analyzing the Plaintiff's retaliation claim under I.C. §

7

Surrell v. Californian Water

Pocatello Sch. Dist No. 25,429 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1205 (D. Idaho 2006).

The Court

67-5911, the retaliation provision of the IHRA.

8

The element at issue in the prior Motion for Summary Judgment and in this
9

Motion for Reconsideration is the first: whether the Plaintiff engaged in a protected
10

activity. Federal courts recognize that a plaintiff can make a prima facie showing on the
11

12

protected activity element by demonstrating she had a reasonable, good faith belief she

13

was opposing unlawful employment practices, even if ultimately the practices are not in

14

fact unlawful. Trent

15

United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997). The Plaintiff's burden is to show

16

she "subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that [her] employer was engaged in

17

V.

Valley Elec. Ass'n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994); Little

V.

unlawful employment practices, but also that [her] belief was objectively reasonable in

18

light of the facts and record presented." Little, 103 F.3d at 960.
19

The Court fully credits the Plaintiff's assertion throughout this litigation that she
20

believed in good faith the conduct she opposed was unlawful.

The Plaintiff has

21
22

consistently characterized this conduct as the affair between Mr. Warren and Ms. Stiles

23

and Mr. Warren's alleged favoritism of Ms. Stiles and the SUR Unit.

24

believed this conduct amounted to sexual harassment, particularly a hostile work

25

environment, and gender discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the IHRA.

The Plaintiff

The

26
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question is whether her belief is objectively reasonable. Considering the record in a
2

light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds it was not.

3

First, the overwhelming majority of courts, including courts in the Ninth Circuit

4

that have addressed this issue, have held that favoritism of a paramour does not violate

5

Title VII.

6

2006); Preston

7

8

See, e.g., Tenge v. Philips Modern Agric. Co., 446 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir.
V.

Wisconsin Health Fund, 397 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2005); Ackel

Nat'! Communications, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2003); Schobert

V.

V.

Illinois Dep't

of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002); Womack v. Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298,

9

1300-01 (11th Cir. 1998); Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369-70
10

(10th Cir. 1997); Becerra

V.

Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1996); Candelore v.

11

12

Clark County Sanitation Dist., 752 F. Supp. 956, 960-61 (D. Nev. 1990); DeCintio

V.

13

Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1985).

14

voiced concerns about activity that, if proven, would not state a violation of Title VII.

15

The Plaintiff concedes the above, but implicitly argues it is not relevant to

16

whether the Plaintiff reasonably believed paramour favoritism was a violation of Title VII

17

The Plaintiff

and the IHRA. However, whether the actual conduct complained of would violate Title

18

VII is relevant to the Court's inquiry, although an actual violation of Title VII need not be
19

proven. See Trent, 41 F.3d at 526. The Ninth Circuit has considered the substantive
20
21
22

state of the law to be relevant to the reasonableness of a plaintiff's belief. E.E.O.C. v.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994,1005-06 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that

23

U[i]n the face of voluminous contrary legal precedent" the employee could not have

24

been reasonable in his belief the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity). This

25

comports with the approach of other federal courts.

See, e.g., Clover v. Total Sys.

26
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Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The objective reasonableness of an
2

employee's belief that her employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice

3

must be measured against existing substantive law."); Hamner v. Sf. Vincent Hosp. &

4

Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting the plaintiff's belief

5

"must be objectively reasonable, which means that the complaint must involve

6

discrimination that is prohibited by Title VI I.").

7

Even if the Court does not charge the Plaintiff with knowledge of the state of the

8

law regarding paramour favoritism under Title VII, there is little in the record that would
9

support the reasonableness of the Plaintiff's belief that the conduct violated Title VII or
10

the IHRA. Title VII and the IHRA are not general workplace grievance statutes. Rather,
11
12

they prohibit specific types of discrimination, including discrimination based on a

13

person's sex or gender. Nothing in the record suggests the Plaintiff voiced concerns

14

about sex or gender discrimination. The Plaintiff consistently opposed alleged acts of

15

favoritism arising out a consensual affair between her supervisor, Mr. Warren, and a

16

lateral co-worker, Ms. Stiles. The Plaintiff makes three main arguments in support of

17

the reasonableness of her belief this conduct violated Title VII and the IHRA.

18

First, the Plaintiff argues the Defendant's Workplace Training materials led her to

19

believe that the conduct at issue violated Title VII and the IHRA. This argument is not
20

supported by the materials themselves. The materials state in relevant part:
21

22

23
24

25

Sexual harassment at work occurs whenever unwelcome conduct on the
basis of gender affects a person's job. It is defined by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as "unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individuals work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
... The second kind of sexual harassment is called "hostile environment."

26
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2
3

A supervisor, co-worker, or someone else with whom the victim comes in
contact on the job creates an abusive work environment or interferes with
the employee's work performance through words or deeds because of the
victim's gender. A sexually hostile work environment can be created by:
. . . granting job favors to those who participate in consensual sexual
activity . ... "

4

5

Plaintiffs Affidavit, Ex. 1, p. 1 (some emphasis added). Even applying this standard,

6

the Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating the favoritism at issue was due to

7

Plaintiff's, or any other person's, sex or gender. Neither does the record, analyzed in a

8
9

light most favorable to the Plaintiff, support a conclusion that the affair created an
abusive or hostile work environment.

If the Plaintiff concluded after reading these

10

materials that an isolated instance of paramour favoritism fell into either category of
11

sexual harassment as described in the training materials, that conclusion was not
12
13

objectively reasonable. In any event, federal courts have found that employer training

14

materials that are more restrictive than Title VII do not create a reasonable belief on the

15

part of the employee that conduct violates Title VII. See Sherk v. Adesa Atlanta, LLC,

16

432 F.Supp.2d 1358,1372 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

17

Second, the Plaintiff argues her alleged discussions with IDHW Human

18

Resources representatives support the reasonableness of her belief that the conduct at

19

issue violated the Title VII and the IHRA.

Ms. Graham said she was "looking into

20

potential violations of Title VII" and Ms. Zimmerman said a "hostile work environment
21

was clearly a violation of the law." Assuming these statements were made, they do not
22
23

support the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs belief.

Even if the statements were

24

actually specific to the conduct at issue, the Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case

25

of retaliation by showing that she had a "good faith belief in another's good faith belief

26

that their employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices." Ross v. City of
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Perry, No. 5:07-CV-433 (CAR), 2009 WL 3190450, at *13 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2009).
2

Third, the Plaintiff argues her legal research and her discovery of the Miller case

3

supports the reasonableness of her belief that Mr. Warren's conduct violated Title VII

4

and the IHRA. However, the timing of her legal research-December of 2006, making it

5

after she was allegedly engaging in protected activity-renders it irrelevant to the

6

Court's inquiry, which is directed to whether the Plaintiff had a reasonable, good faith

7

8

belief she was engaging in protected activity at the time she opposed the employment
practice.

9

Even setting aside this problem of chronology, the Miller case is wholly
10

distinguishable from the activity at the center of the Plaintiff's case. See Miller v. Oep't
11
12

of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 91-92 (Cal. 2005).

13

arguably created an "atmosphere demeaning to women." Id. at 92. The Miller case is

14

an extreme example of a workplace environment where widespread affairs and

15

favoritism created an environment where women could feel they were merely "sexual

16

playthings" and that the only way to move up the ladder was by engaging in sexual

17

Miller entailed widespread behavior that

conduct with the boss. Id. The Miller court approvingly quoted (and then distinguished)

18

the EEOC policy guidelines:
19

23

[a]n isolated instance of favoritism toward a 'paramour' (or a spouse, or a
friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or men
in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other
than their genders. [Fn. omitted.] A female charging party who is denied
an employment benefit because of such sexual favoritism would not have
been treated more favorably had she been a man, nor, conversely, was
she treated less favorably because she was a woman.

24

Id. at 89 (quoting EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability under Title VII for

25

Sexual Favoritism, EEOC Notice No. 915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990».

20
21
22

26
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Here, the Plaintiff faced one isolated affair and some acts of favoritism. Miller
2

itself stated that such isolated instances do not rise to the level of "widespread sexual

3

favoritism," a position consistent with EEOC policy guidelines. Id. at 93. What allegedly

4

occurred at IDHW was precisely the type of isolated affair and isolated incidents of

5

favoritism that the Miller court itself (along with the EEOC policy guidelines and the

6

great majority of federal courts) stated did not violate Title VII. Judging the record in a

7

light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there is evidence Mr. Warren had an affair with the

8

Plaintiff's lateral co-worker and may have engaged in various acts of favoritism. There
9

is no evidence of widespread sexual favoritism or of an atmosphere demeaning to
10

women. Therefore, the Plaintiff's reading of Miller does not support the reasonableness
11

12

of her beliefs regarding the legality of the affair and the alleged acts of favoritism.

13

In conclusion, the Court's review of the record, including the new affidavit

14

submitted with the present Motion, shows that the Plaintiff never drew a line between

15

Mr. Warren's conduct and discrimination against her or anyone else based on, or

16

related in any way, to a person's sex or gender. The reason why the majority of courts

17

18

have found that favoritism of a paramour is not sex or gender discrimination under Title
VII is because both males and females are equally adversely affected. Nothing in the

19

record suggests otherwise or takes this case outside of the ordinary paramour
20

favoritism case.

There is no doubt the Plaintiff subjectively believed Mr. Warren's

21
22

23

conduct was wrong, violated IDHW policy, and violated the law.

But, analyzing the

record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court cannot find her

24

subjective belief was objectively reasonable. Therefore, there are no genuine issues of

25

material fact on the first element of the Plaintiff's IHRA claim.

"From a practical

26
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standpoint, there is every reason for an employer to discourage this kind of intra-office
2

romance, as it is often bad for morale, but that is different from saying it violates Title

3

VII." Schobert, 304 F.3d at 733.
CONCLUSION

4

5
6

7

The Court DENIES the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
Granting Summary on the Plaintiffs IHRA claim.
DATED this

2

day of January 2010.

8
9
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MI HAEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

OEPUTY

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV OC 07 17095

LYNETIE PATTERSON,

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE and
JOHN/JANE DOES I THROUGH X,
whose true identities are presently
unknown,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: Jason R. N. Monteleone of Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P.
For Defendants: Brian Benjamin, Deputy Attorney General, Office of Attorney General
In accordance with the Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Motion for
Summary

Judgment

and

Memorandum

Decision

Re:

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary Judgment,

JUDGEMENT IS HEREBY ORDERED in favor of Defendant, State of Idaho,
Department of Health and Welfare as a matter of law.
Costs awarded to Defendant in the amount of $2,033.10 (Two Thousand ThirtyThree Dollars and 10/100's).

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the preceding judgment, I hereby

CERTIFY, in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that the Court has
decided all claims and defenses presented by these consolidated cases and has

FINAL JUDGMENT - CASE NO. CVOC0717095 - PAGE 1

00848

determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a FINAL JUDGMENT
and the Court has and does hereby direct that the preceding judgment shall be a FINAL
JUDGMENT upon which execution may issue and an appeal my be taken as provided
by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
Dated this ~ day of--L-_ _ _- f - , 2010.

M'I
AEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the -!2day of

~

, 2010, I mailed (served) a

true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Jason R. N. Monteleone, Esq.
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, LLP
405 S. 8th St., Ste. 250
Boise, ID 83702
Brian B. Benjamin, DAG
Office of Attorney General
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

By

e/Jo

Deputy Clerk
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Jason R.N. Monteleone (ISB No. 5441)
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2100
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424
jason@treasurevalleylawyers.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Lynette Patterson,
Plaintiff/Appellant
v.

Case No. CV OC 07 17095

State of Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare and John/Jane Does I through X,
whose true identities are presently
unknown,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Defendants/Respondents

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, THAT PARTY'S ATTORNEY,
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL AND DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL BRIAN
BENJAMIN, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Plaintiff/Appellant, Lynette Patterson, appeals against
the above-named Defendant/Respondent, State of Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the orders and
rulings made by the Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin in granting
Defendant's/Respondent's motion for summary judgment and denying

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- I
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:

Plaintiffs/Appellant's motion for reconsideration relative to the summary
judgment rulings and orders.
2.

The above-named Plaintiff/Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court, and the judgments or orders described in paragraph
above are appealable orders, under and pursuant to I.A.R. 11(a)(1).

3.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL:
(a)

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to
Defendant/Respondent on Plaintiff s/Appellant's claim under the
Idaho Human Rights Act, I.C. §67-5901, et seq.; and

(b) Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to
Defendant/Respondent on Plaintiff s/Appellant's claim under the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, I.e. §6-230 1, et seq.
4.

No order has been entered which has sealed any portion of the record in
these proceedings.

5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No.

(b)

Appellants request the preparation of the following pOliions of the
reporter's transcript: N/A.

6.

Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under LA.R. 28: None.

7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has not been served on the
court reporter, as no reporter's transcript is requested or been
ordered;

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 2
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(b)

That the clerk of the district court has not been paid an estimated
fee for preparation of the court reporter's transcript, as no
reporter's transcript is requested or been ordered;

(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has
been paid in the amount of $30.00;

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to LA.R. 20 and I.e. §67-1401(l).

¥L

DATED: This

Jk day of February, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
,tf:.
I CERTIFY that on the f.::, -day of February, 2010, I caused a true and correct

I

copy of the foregoing document to be:
~

lB"illailed

o ha~livered
[It'fffinsmitted fax machine
to: (208) 854-8073

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 4

Brian B. Benjamin
Deputy Attorney General
Civil Litigation Division
450 W. State Street
P. O. Box 83720
Boise,ID 83720-0010
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LYNETTE PATTERSON,
Supreme Court Case No. 37416
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE and
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose
true identities are presently unknow,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk ofthe District Court of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal ofthe said
Court this 6th day of April, 2010.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LYNETTE PATTERSON,
Supreme Court Case No. 37416
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE and
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose
true identities are presently unknow,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NA V ARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

JASON R.N. MONTELEONE

BRIAN B. BENJAMIN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

1. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk ofthe District Court

Date of Service:

----------------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LYNETTE PATTERSON,
Supreme Court Case No. 37416
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE and
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose
true identities are presently unknow,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
16th day of February, 2010.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
A TTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation
BRIAN B. BENJAMIN, ISB # 5422
KARIN D. JONES, ISB #6846
Deputy Attorneys General
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720-0010
Telephone:
(208) 334-2400
Facsimile:
(208) 854-8073
brian.benjamin@ag.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA
LYNETTE PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,

v.

) Case No. CV-OC-2007-17095
)

) MOTION FOR ADDITION TO CLERK'S
) RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO

) I.A.R.29(a)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
HEAL TH AND WELFARE and
JOHNIJANE DOES I THROUGH X, whose
true identities are presently unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

----------------------------- )
COMES NOW, Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, by and
through its counsel of record, Brian Benjamin, Deputy Attorney General and hereby moves the
Court pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a) for an Order adding the following documents to the Clerk's
Record on Appeal in Supreme Court Case No. 37416:

1//

/II

MOTION FOR ADDITION TO CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 29(a) -

)

100857

ORIGINAL

From the Register of Actions (ROA) Report of Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada
County:
06115/09

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

06/15/09

Affidavit of Monica Young

06115109

Affidavit of Bethany Zimmerman

06115/09

Affidavit of Heidi Graham

06115/09

Affidavit of Richard Armstrong

06115/09

Affidavit of David Butler

06115/09

Affidavit of Brian Benjamin

06/15/09

Affidavit of Mond Warren

06/15/09

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

06115109

Statement of Undisputed Facts

07/01/09

Affidavit of Lynette Patterson

07/08/09

Reply to Affidavit of Lynette Patterson

07/10109

Affidavit of Jason RN Monteleone

07/10109

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment

07/10109

Statement of Undisputed Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment

07/20109

Reply to PL's Memorandum in Opposition to DF's Motion for Summary
Judgment

10107/09

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary
Judgment on Plaintiffs IHRA Claim

10107/09

Affidavit of Lynette Patterson in Support of Plaintiffs Motion

11/23/09

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration of Order
Granting Summary Judgment on Plaintiff s IHRA Claim

Defendant requests any incorporated attachments to any affidavits andlor documents to
also be included with the affidavit andlor document.

MOTION FOR ADDITION TO CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 29(a) - 2
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Defendant hereby certifies that the above entitled case has been appealed to the Idaho
Supreme Court, and that the above requested documents were not previously included in the
Clerks Record, which was served on Defendants' April 6, 2010; that the Clerk's Record in this
matter has not yet been settled and time to make corrections, additions and/or deletions before
the District Court has not yet run.

Finally, Defendants certify that the above requested

documents are necessary for a full and fair appellate review of the District Court's Decision. In
the event any objection is filed, oral argument is requested.
DA TED this 26th day of April, 2010.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

~~
-

By

/

>

j

~

""

~~

~~
Deputy Attorney ~eral

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April, 2010, I forwarded a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the following method to:
Jason R. N. Monteleone, Esq.
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE,
th

405 S. 8 St., Ste. 250
Boise, ID 83702

LLP

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
D Electronic Mail
L8J Facsimile: (208) 947-2424

MOTION FOR ADDITION TO CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 29(a) - 3

00859

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY 0

LYNETTE PATTERSON,
PlaintitT,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE and
JOHNIJANE DOES I THROUGH X, whose
true identities are presently unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ADA

Case No. CV -OC-2007-17095

ORDER ON STIPULATION FOR
ADDITION TO CLERK'S RECORD ON
APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 29(a)

------------------------------)
Having considered the Stipulation of the parties for addition to Clerk's Record on Appeal
pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a) in this matter;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation for Addition to Clerk's Record on
Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a) is approved. The following documents from the Register of
Actions (ROA) Report of Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County shall be added to the
Clerk's Record on Appeal in Supreme Court Case No. 37416:
06/15/09

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

06/15/09

Affidavit of Monica Young

06/15/09

Affidavit of Bethany Zimmerman

06/15/09

Affidavit of Heidi Graham

06/15/09

Affidavit of Richard Armstrong

06/15/09

Affidavit of David Butler

06/15/09

Affidavit of Brian Benjamin

06/15/09

Affidavit of Mond Warren

06115109

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

06/15/09

Statement of Undisputed Facts

ORDER - I
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07/01109

Affidavit of Lynette Patterson

07/08/09

Reply to Affidavit of Lynette Patterson

07/10109

Affidavit of Jason RN Monteleone

07110109

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment

07/10109

Statement of Undisputed Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment

07/20109

Reply to PL's Memorandum in Opposition to DF's Motion for Summary
Judgment

10107/09

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary
Judgment on Plaintiffs IHRA Claim

10107/09

Affidavit of Lynette Patterson in Support of Plaintiffs Motion

11/23/09

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Order
Granting Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs IHRA Claim

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any incorporated attachments to any affidavits and/or
documents to also be included with the affidavit and/or document.

DATED this

/tJ

day of

JIll'{

7'

2010

District Judge

ORDER-2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
,//

I hereby certify that on the

{3

day

correct copy of the within instrument to:

of~, 2010, I mailed (served) a true and

f'

Jason R. N. Monteleone, Esq.
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, LLP
405 S. 8th St., Ste. 250
Boise, ID 83702
Brian B. Benjamin, DAG
Office of Attorney General
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

ORDER-3
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